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Executive summary
 
This report is the outcome of a year-long interactive and participatory process 
led by the European Commission’s Joint Research Centre (JRC) on the Future of 
Migration in the European Union (EU). The project responded to the growing demand 
from European Commission services for foresight and anticipatory knowledge 
around future migration patterns. Based on a set of four future migration scenarios, 
the project engaged several stakeholders in exploring and reflecting upon the needs 
of EU policymaking and EU responses around future migration challenges and 
opportunities. 
Predicting future migration trends is difficult because forecasting models are unable 
to capture the plethora of social, political, demographic, economic, environmental 
and technological drivers that fundamentally underpin and shape migration 
processes. A foresight approach focuses on plausibility and offers visions and 
narratives as to what alternative futures could look like. It produces scenarios built 
around variables that are both relatively certain and uncertain and is most useful 
when applied to mid to longer-term futures. When used as a starting point for 
debate and engagement with diverse stakeholders, narrative scenarios enhance 
a systemic and nuanced understanding of a policy issue and can help stimulate 
cooperation among various actors. This is particularly important when tackling 
complex and politicised policy issues such as migration. 
In this report, we briefly present four foresight scenarios for the future of migration 
in the EU, with 2030 as a future timeframe. The scenarios were used to explore 
policy implications of different political, economic and migration developments 
for specific thematic areas of EU policymaking: foreign and security policy, labour 
market and integration policies. We also explored how the scenarios could play out 
in different parts of the world, the result of which are brief scenario narratives for 
the EU, European neighbourhood, sub-Saharan Africa and Southeast Asia developed 
by invited experts. 
Points for reflection derived from these insights include:
Forward-looking policy thinking about migration in the European Union should 
be based on long-term migration trends and should emphasise the importance 
of coherence between migration and other policy areas.
The level of attention paid by policymakers to specific migration flows should not 
be determined by heightened media and political attention to refugee and irregular 
migration as opposed to more substantial but less talked-about migrant flows such 
as labour and family migration. Policymakers need to carefully communicate their 
efforts in tackling challenges emerging from migration, but the role of migration 
policies alone should not be over-estimated as there are many other factors 
determining migration flows that are outside of the remit of migration policies 
(including, but not limited to, development, labour demand, welfare and foreign 
policies). Similarly, immigrant integration outcomes will depend on policy areas that 
go beyond integration policies. Therefore, internal and external policy coherence and 
coordination are essential to producing desired migration and integration outcomes.
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Effective migration governance requires inclusive multilateral cooperation 
based on more equal partnerships with third countries and increased attention 
paid to the role of diasporas.
One of the possible futures for the EU’s position in global governance of migration 
is that it will not maintain its leverage in relations with third countries. This situation 
could be conducive to more equal partnership relations with those countries and 
potentially facilitate negotiations of readmission agreements. To support the 
success of partnerships with third countries, their diasporas will need to have a 
bigger say in policies of destination countries. At the same time, in sub-Saharan 
Africa, inflows of various forms of capital from the diaspora need to be supported 
but also carefully managed because they could disrupt social and economic 
opportunities for the “locals” and give rise to internal political resistance against the 
political influence of diaspora citizens. In Southeast Asia, where growing number of 
countries is likely to experience population decline, diaspora groups will be crucial in 
facilitating mobility of skilled labour force across borders.
By 2030, the EU may no longer be among the most attractive destinations 
for migrants coming from the EU neighbourhood, sub-Saharan Africa and 
Southeast Asia because other regions could offer better economic and social 
prospects to foreign workers and their families. 
In the long-term, the EU should move beyond the current policy focus on stemming 
migration flows. Reflections on a possible future in which the EU will face a shortage 
of immigrants of all skill levels should begin by paying close attention to other 
countries (such as China) with an ageing population and shrinking workforce that 
may strive to become more attractive destinations than the EU. Therefore, new 
strategies to attract people will need to be devised with a particular focus on highly-
skilled migrants from third countries. These strategies will need to take into account 
not only demand from employers but also technological innovation that affects 
production and service systems. The progress and acceptance of labour-replacing 
automation will likely be affected by interrelations between labour market priorities 
and migration policies. 
This project was driven by our conviction that in order to have a stronger impact, 
foresight knowledge requires customised engagement methods. Therefore, this 
report is accompanied by a Migration discussion toolkit that brings together 
participatory and interactive tools and processes we developed and tested with 
diverse audiences. The toolkit can be used as a practical guide for leading future-
oriented and strategic discussions on migration. It offers a platform for collaboration 
and planning inside organisations, as well as for building relations with external 
partners and stakeholders.
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1. INTRODUCTION
1 The project was carried out in the EU Policy Lab. 
2 This project is a result of collaboration between the JRC Centre of Expertise on Population and Migration (CEPAM) and the International Institute for 
Applied Systems Analysis (IIASA) from 2016 to 2019. For more information about the results, please follow the website of the European Commission 
Knowledge Centre on Migration and Demography: https://ec.europa.eu/jrc/en/migration-and-demography/partnerships/demographic-scenarios.
The European Commission Joint Research Centre’s 
(JRC) project on the Future of Migration in the EU1 
responded to the growing demand from the European 
Commission for foresight and anticipatory knowledge 
around likely future migration patterns. Based on a set 
of four scenarios of the future of migration, the project 
engaged a group of experts and policymakers to 
explore and reflect upon the needs of EU policymaking 
and possible EU responses to future migration 
challenges and opportunities. 
The need for future-oriented thinking had become 
particularly apparent in the context of the rapid 
increase in the numbers of refugee and immigrant 
arrivals to the EU during 2014 and 2015. The 
institutional and political fallout of this situation 
put different services of the European Commission 
into a near crisis mode. The EU institutions were 
often criticized for their reactive actions and failure 
to anticipate future challenges and opportunities in 
the sphere of migration and displacement. At the 
same time, migration has long been recognized as an 
important factor in the overall population dynamics in 
European ageing societies with immigration replacing 
births as the principal component of population growth 
in several EU countries. Demographic forecasts are 
an essential resource for policy planning and to be 
credible, they need to account for future migration 
dynamics. Hence, the appetite has been growing for 
more comprehensive and forward-looking migration 
analysis to inform future EU policymaking. 
1.1. Difficulties in predicting 
migration flows 
The emphasis on better measurement of migration 
dynamics and demand for quantitative forecasts of future 
migration flows has been growing in recent years. Such 
predictions are essential for building institutional capacity 
to anticipate, prepare for possible future crises and 
produce policies better attuned to future trends.
The JRC has already done substantial work on this 
subject: 1) by quantifying major drivers of migration and 
exploring how they change in relation to development 
stages of countries and different dimensions of migration 
(Migali, Natale & Münz 2018; Migali, Natale, Tintori, et 
al. 2018). 2) by exploring possible future impacts of 
alternative migration scenarios for the EU with respect to 
population ageing and the productivity of the EU labour 
force.2 
However, there is also ample evidence about the 
challenges in predicting a phenomenon as complex and 
multifaceted as migration (Bijak 2016; Disney et al. 2015; 
Migali, Natale & Münz 2018; OECD 2016). Predicting 
future migration trends is such a difficult task because 
forecasting models are not able to capture the multitude 
of social, political, demographic, economic, environmental 
and technological drivers that underpin migration 
processes. These drivers are often highly uncertain and 
hard to quantify, and their mutual interactions result in 
different migration outcomes. Models are also limited 
by poor quality or missing migration data and different 
definitions of what constitutes migration across countries. 
As a result, different methods and data sources have 
produced vastly different projections of migration flows 
(OECD 2016). 
Since migration cannot be predicted without substantial 
errors, it is essential that the uncertainty around migration 
forecasts is made explicit to policymakers and the 
general public (Disney et al. 2015). Another possibility 
is to combine forecasting with a qualitative approach to 
scenario-building in which uncertainties are embraced and 
made a central element of the discussion about future 
trends and their implications for managing migration. 
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1.2. Scenario-based 
approach as a way 
to explore alternative 
migration futures 
Forecasting often focuses on probability and risk, and 
uses models built around variables that are considered 
fairly likely to happen in order to offer predictions as 
to what the future will look like. It is usually applied to 
short-term futures. A foresight approach, by contrast, 
offers visions or narratives as to what possible 
alternative futures might look like. It produces scenarios 
built around variables that are both relatively certain 
and uncertain and is most useful when applied to mid to 
longer-term futures. 
Scenarios tend to highlight rather than reduce the 
complexity of policy issues. They are generated through 
discussions about the past and the future that often help 
reveal taken-for-granted assumptions about the matter.
The usefulness of narrative scenarios for policymaking 
processes is sometimes questioned because they do not 
provide clear answers supported by numbers. However, 
they are very useful in creating a space for reflection 
that can lead to new questions and potentially new 
solutions to policy problems. Scenario-based exercises 
also have the potential to move participants beyond a 
process of single loop of learning where experts simply 
impart information to decision-makers, to one of double 
and triple loop learning where participants can reframe 
problems and solutions and undergo a process of 
transformation.
Moreover, given the contentious and highly politicised 
nature of migration policymaking, discussion of 
alternative scenarios is a useful tool to overcome 
divisive positions held by different stakeholders and 
to build a shared understanding of possible futures. 
In this way, qualitative scenarios can help stimulate 
cooperation among stakeholders that is essential for 
tackling complex policy issues. 
3 The Migration discussion toolkit can be printed as a standalone document. 
1.3. The aim and the 
structure of the report
The aim of this report is to present briefly the insights 
from the process through which we developed the four 
scenarios of the future of migration in the EU and to 
demonstrate in a practical way how the scenarios can 
be used to stimulate forward-looking discussions about 
migration. 
We started by commissioning a background study that 
analyses past and recent migration trends, their drivers 
and intended and unintended consequences of migration 
policies (de Haas 2018). This work together with other 
foresight reports on migration and discussions with 
experts helped us identify a list of relative certainties 
and uncertainties that are likely to influence the future of 
migration in the EU (see section 3). We then incorporated 
the certainties and uncertainties into the development 
of four synthetic scenarios on the future of migration by 
2030 (see section 4.1). We presented the insights from 
the project to a wide range of policymakers and experts 
in a workshop that contributed to challenging some 
of the taken-for-granted ideas about migration which 
emerged from our analysis of dominant policy discourses 
and our discussions with the experts (see section 2).
The synthetic scenarios were then used as a starting 
point in focus groups with experts and policymakers and 
inspired contributions from members of our Advisory 
Committee. Section 4.2 presents insights from the focus 
groups in which we explored what the alternative futures 
could mean for specific policy areas of EU policymaking 
such as foreign and security policy, labour market policies 
and integration. Section 4.3 includes contributions from 
the members of the Advisory Committee who further 
elaborate how the scenarios could play out in the EU, its 
neighbourhood, sub-Saharan Africa and Southeast Asia.  
The second part of the report consists of a Migration 
discussion toolkit with various participatory and 
interactive tools and processes developed throughout 
the project in order to stimulate forward-looking 
and collaborative group discussions on the future of 
migration and integration in the EU.3 The toolkit suggests 
practical ways of employing the migration scenarios as a 
starting point for such debates. The tools presented there 
can help build platforms for collaboration both inside 
organisations (in and outside of the EU) and between the 
EU institutions and external partners and stakeholders. 
This part of the report will be of interest to those seeking 
to employ innovative ways of exploring the future 
relevance of migration and the roles and interactions of 
different actors in migration policymaking.
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2. CHALLENGING TAKEN-FOR-
GRANTED ASSUMPTIONS ABOUT 
MIGRATION
4 For summaries and short videos of all the interventions, see a post on the EU Policy Lab blog: https://blogs.ec.europa.eu/eupolicylab/nine-myths-about-
migration-and-long-term-trends-you-might-not-have-thought-about/
There is now a large body of literature on different 
aspects migration. Yet, despite the high level of 
academic and general interest in the subject, we see 
perpetuation of certain taken-for-granted assumptions 
in policy debates about migration.
In 2017, we organised a one-day workshop on the 
future of migration in the EU. The event brought 
together over 80 researchers, representatives of civil  
society, think-tanks, Member States and different 
sections of the European Commission. We invited 
experts who were involved in our scenario discussions 
to question some of the commonly held myths and 
taken-for-granted assumptions about migration 
and integration. Below we summarise some of the 
interventions that are most relevant to the focus of 
this report.4 
BOX 1:  THE LEVEL OF ATTENTION PAID BY THE MEDIA AND POLICY-MAKERS TO REFUGEE AND 
IRREGULAR MIGRATION AS OPPOSED TO OTHER MIGRANT FLOWS IS NOT JUSTIFIED BY 
THE NUMBERS
There is a discrepancy between the attention paid by the media and policy-makers to refugee and irregular 
migration as opposed to other migrant flows.
By Rainer Münz, Adviser on Migration and Demography to the European Political Strategy Centre (EPSC)
Asylum seekers and migrants arriving irregularly in higher numbers during the years 2014-2017 have come to 
symbolise migration to Europe. Media coverage has strongly contributed to this bias and helped to shift the debate 
towards the need to regain control over the borders and away from (a) regular migrants who come to the EU in 
an orderly manner and (b) migrants who enter the EU with valid visa, as visa-free travellers or with short-term 
permits, but do not leave within 90 days or after their residence permit has expired. In 2016, according to Eurostat, 
there were 2.3 million first residence permits issued to non-EU citizens, either for employment reasons (853,000), 
family reunion (779,000), or education (695,000). In the same year, 1,204,000 people asked for asylum. A similar 
shift of attention happens with fatal journeys. Here the main focus is on those irregular migrants losing their lives 
in the Mediterranean while those who die when crossing the Sahara are usually not mentioned and never become 
the target of any rescue operations or other forms of humanitarian intervention.
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BOX 3:  STRENGTHENING OF BORDERS AND RESTRICTIVE VISA REGIMES MAY NOT BE THE MOST 
EFFECTIVE WAY TO MANAGE MIGRATION
Countries with high migration restrictions do not necessarily succeed in reducing immigration and liberalisa-
tion of border controls does not always lead to massive and uncontrolled migration flows.
By Simona Vezzoli, Postdoctoral Researcher, Faculty of Social and Behavioural Sciences, University of Amsterdam
Evidence on global migration trends shows that countries with high migration restrictions do not necessarily suc-
ceed in reducing immigration. For example, Mexican migration to the United States shows that increasing restric-
tions and border enforcements along the US-Mexico border did not stop migration, but pushed Mexicans desiring 
to migrate to use more smuggling services and to cross the border at isolated and dangerous border points. This 
has made migration costlier and more dangerous, lowered return rates and increased settlement of Mexican fami-
lies in the United States. In Europe, Moroccans could travel freely to Spain up until 1991. Young Moroccans would 
often work and visit Spain during the summer months and then go back home. Such circulation was halted with the 
introduction of travel visas. This made young Moroccans who entered Spain to remain longer, eventually increasing 
their permanent settlement. On the flip side of this, is the myth that liberalisation of border controls will expose 
countries to massive and uncontrolled migration flows. The EU enlargement experience challenges this assumption. 
The enlargement of the 1980s did not lead to massive outflows from Greece, Portugal or Spain although this was 
in part also because of temporary restrictions on the free movement of workers from these countries. The 2004 
enlargement resulted in higher emigration rates but only from some new member states (such as Baltic States, 
Poland, Romania and Bulgaria). Although emigration from these countries continues, the initial increase in numbers 
rapidly normalized to lower migration volumes and circulation patterns.
BOX 2: MIGRATION POLICY HAS A LIMITED ROLE IN DETERMINING MIGRATION FLOWS
Only a small proportion of migration flows can be directly controlled by migration policy and many factors 
with a major influence on determining migration flows lie outside of the remit of migration policies.
By Jean-Christophe Dumont, Head of the International Migration Division in the Directorate for Employment, Labour 
and Social Affairs of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD)
Migration policy is naturally seen as a key tool to control and manage migration flows. However, only a small 
proportion of migration flows can be directly controlled by migration policy. Consider for example free movement 
of people in areas without border controls or family and humanitarian migration that are both rights-based and 
depend on the fulfilment of certain criteria rather than on migration policy priorities. Therefore, it can be estimated 
that less than half of all movements, mostly related to labour migration, can be directly controlled by migration 
policy. Although migration policy also affects the rights-based flows, for example by setting conditions for family 
reunion such as minimum income or language requirements, it is clear that many factors with a major influence 
on determining migration flows lie outside of the remit of migration policies. Take, for example, the case of energy 
transitions. The extent to which we will be able to replace carbon energy with green energy will impact the price of 
oil and potentially the stability and prosperity of major oil producing countries such as the Gulf countries, Nigeria 
or Russia. Such changes could dramatically alter the demand and supply of migrants worldwide. If we do not anti-
cipate what might happen in these migration hub countries, we may find greater pressures at our borders in the 
future.
Furthermore, the very idea of countries using their migration policies to compete for high-skilled migrants is also a 
myth. Thanks to information exchange and continuous dialogue, OECD countries’ policies to attract and retain high-
skilled migrants have converged so much so that other factors and migrants’ individual choices determine where 
they migrate. In other words, rather than countries picking high-skilled migrants, it is the people picking the country 
based on characteristics not necessarily related to its migration policies.
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BOX 4:  STANDARD MIGRATION DATA DOES NOT FULLY REFLECT THE SCALE AND THE NATURE OF 
HUMAN MOBILITY
The importance of tourism is poorly understood despite its potentially strong link to migration.
By Ronald Skeldon, Emeritus Professor in Geography, University of Sussex and Professor of Human Geography, 
Graduate School of Governance Maastricht University
The 2015 United Nations figure of 244 million international migrants worldwide is well known. It reflects the num-
ber of persons living in a country other than where they were born for more than a year or, in the absence of such 
data, the number of people of foreign citizenship. The figure includes refugees and was 41 % higher compared to 
2000. But does it adequately express what is happening with human mobility? By definition, short-term and cir-
cular mobility is missing from these statistics and so is data about actual cross-border flows of people. Yet, these 
are important elements of how people actually move. In particular, the importance of tourism is poorly understood 
despite its potentially strong link to migration. The number of international arrivals has grown more than fivefold 
between 1990 and 2016. Although this number does not reflect the actual number of tourists, its massive growth 
is indicative of the rising importance of the phenomena. Statistically and also in terms of policy, tourism is treated 
as separate from migration. However, it can both expand migration and act as a substitute for longer-term stays. 
In Europe, migrants have been a key source of labour to the growing tourism industry; the hospitality sector could 
hardly function without foreign workers. However, expanding tourism can also lead to the expulsion of local popu-
lations, for example due to rising prices and therefore generate internal or even international out migration. Open 
paths for tourist travel can also dissuade people from settling on a more long-term basis. Without systematic inclu-
sion of short-term movers, our understanding of human mobility and migration dynamics is bound to be limited.
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3. CONSIDERING MIGRATION IN 
THE CONTEXT OF RELATIVE  
CERTAINTIES AND UNCERTAINTIES
5 Hein de Haas, Simona Vezzoli, Ayla Bonfiglio from the International Migration Institute: https://www.imi.ox.ac.uk/completed-projects/gmf 
6 For the list of members of the Advisory Committee see the Annex.
7 For a comprehensive overview of drivers of migration that can be quantified based on existing data see a JRC report (Migali, Natale, Tintori, et al. 2018).
One of the benefits of the foresight approach to 
migration is that it prompts consideration of a wide 
range of social, economic, political, demographic 
and environmental variables that are likely to affect 
migration and related socio-economic processes. 
Moreover, scenario development encourages 
discussions about how the various variables interact 
with each other. In that way, it also prompts us to 
step back and look at the issue from different angles 
and perspectives.
The importance and future impacts of social, 
economic, political, demographic and environmental 
variables can be considered either relatively certain or 
relatively uncertain. Our scenarios were built around 
what we considered to be the most important of these 
variables.
Relative certainties are variables characterised by 
their continuity (i.e. they will play an important role 
no matter what), and by relative predictability in 
terms of how the trends underpinning the variable 
are likely to evolve in the future. Their development 
and evolution can be monitored through data and 
accumulated knowledge that can be projected for 
at least 10 years ahead. Demographic trends, for 
example, can be projected with relative certainty 
because these trends have already been set 
in motion and are supported by data. Relative 
certainties help to set the parameters of the scenario 
narratives and to ensure that the scenarios remain 
plausible. 
Yet, if relative certainties help to set parameters 
of what is possible, relative uncertainties are most 
interesting in framing the dynamic, contextual 
environment of each scenario. Relative uncertainties 
are variables that are hard to predict and have a 
greater potential for change. Their development and 
evolution depend very much on their interaction with 
other variables (both relatively certain and uncertain) 
and/or the context in which they operate. For 
example, political or economic crises are notoriously 
hard to predict. However, their impact on migration is 
potentially very important. Relative uncertainties can 
impact migration in multiple ways.
The relative certainties and uncertainties were 
identified as important for constructing the future 
migration scenarios for the EU because of their 
potential influence on migration flows by 2030. We 
built on the key migration determinants elaborated in 
the background study that informed the project (de 
Haas 2018). These include the structure of labour 
demand, inequality and levels of development, 
demographic structure and population size, trade, 
welfare and social security, education, infrastructure 
and technological change, political freedoms, 
conflict and violence. Furthermore, three previous 
migration scenario exercises carried out by the 
Development Centre of the Organisation for Economic 
Co-operation and Development (OECD 2016), the 
United Kingdom Government Office for Science (The 
Government Office for Science 2011) and the team 
of researchers associated with the International 
Migration Institute of Oxford University under the 
Global Migration Futures project (2009-2013) served 
as an important inspiration in this process.5 We also 
drew on contributions from experts in our Advisory 
Committee6 and a workshop we organised with them 
in March 2017. We identified relative certainties and 
uncertainties in the social, technological, economic, 
environmental, political and demographic (STEEP+D) 
categories, all of which are likely to influence and 
impact migration outcomes by 2030.
Our aim with the overviews presented in Table 1 and 
Table 2 is to illustrate major drivers that need to be 
considered when building scenarios and discussing 
the future of migration.7 The tables with relative 
certainties and uncertainties are followed by short 
insights from the experts involved in the Advisory 
Committee in which they highlight interesting 
aspects of the selected certainties and uncertainties 
(Box 5 – 9).
The European side is more developed and the 
trends in other parts of the world are treated more 
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generally. We recognise that migration to and from 
the EU is influenced by trends in other parts of 
the world, however, it was not in the scope of this 
report to provide a comprehensive mapping of all 
the relevant developments in other world regions. 
Therefore, the regional differences mentioned below 
should be treated as illustrations only. They would 
obviously need to be further developed if they 
were to be used for more geographically-focused 
discussions. While the overall focus of the scenario 
narratives reflects the currently dominant political 
focus on immigration from non-EU countries, it is 
also important to consider the importance of these 
trends for intra-EU mobility and for the position of 
the EU as a source of migration towards other parts 
of the world.
8 These visual aids can be downloaded here: http://publications.jrc.ec.europa.eu/repository/bitstream/JRC111538/kjnb29060enn.pdf
The lists of certainties and uncertainties can be used 
to stimulate a systemic debate about the future of 
migration and to explore interconnections between 
different trends and variables. For this purpose, we 
developed ready-to-print Certainty and Uncertainty 
cards that are included among the elements 
accompanying the Migration discussion toolkit.8 They 
can be used as prompts during group discussions, 
focus groups or workshops.
BOX 5:  EXPLORING DEMOGRAPHIC CERTAINTIES – THE LINK BETWEEN THE PROPORTION OF YOUNG 
PEOPLE AND LEVELS OF MIGRATION
There is a potential for a decline in internal and international migration flows in regions with a declining youth 
population.
By Ronald Skeldon, Emeritus Professor in Geography, University of Sussex and Professor of Human Geography, 
Graduate School of Governance Maastricht University
One of the few generalizations that can be made about migration is that the majority of people who move tend 
to be young adults and therefore the number of migrants in and from any population must to some extent be a 
function of the number of young adults in that population. Not in any simple deterministic way but nevertheless 
the trend in the number of youthful age groups is a component of any change in migration. For example, in Asia, 
this relationship can be seen in the pattern of internal migration in Japan where the numbers of internal migrants 
declined by some 39 per cent between 1970 and 2010 while the number of young adults declined by 20 per cent. 
Given the declining youth cohorts, we can also envisage the internal movements in China, Thailand, and Vietnam 
slowing down in the near future. While they may expand in India towards 2030, the internal migration may also 
slow thereafter. Given the declining youth cohorts in European countries, we can expect to see a reduction of intra-
European migration, although issues around housing, access to labour markets and growth need also to be added 
to any explanatory mix.
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BOX 6:  EXPLORING SOCIAL CERTAINTIES – ETHNICALLY AND CULTURALLY DIVERSIFIED SOCIETIES 
VERSUS ISLANDS OF HOMOGENEITY IN EUROPE
Despite hyper-diversification of urban centres, some segments of the population might continue to have 
much less exposure to diversity.
By Simona Vezzoli, Postdoctoral Researcher, Faculty of Social and Behavioural Sciences, University of Amsterdam
Cosmopolitan cities like London, Paris and Rome offer a glimpse of how migrants have entered, integrated and 
become part of the socio-economic fabric of global cities. The extent of diversification is visible in rising proportions 
of foreign-born populations (e.g. in 2015, the number of foreign-born people relative to total population in Inner 
London was 41 per cent) and in the number of nationalities present in cosmopolitan cities (e.g. Rome is home to 
citizens from 180 countries). This diversity is linked to the flourishing global networks and migrants’ transnational 
ties that strengthen the connections between origin and main destination countries. While this trend is bound to 
continue, we should not forget that although migrants come from a more diverse set of origin countries, they have 
concentrated in a few major destination countries. Thus they have increased diversity in global cities and regional 
hubs and contributed to the perception that the world is increasingly diverse (Czaika & De Haas 2014). However, 
in some European countries and in particular in more rural areas, exposure to ethnic and cultural diversity is much 
lower. Even super-diverse cities may hide areas of high segregation. Moreover, we must not forget that internatio-
nal migration generally affects certain segments of the population (e.g. urban, professional, service sector workers) 
more so than a country’s populations as a whole. As processes of gentrification and peri-urbanization9 take place, 
we have to consider that, in the midst of hyper-diversification, some segments of the population might continue to 
have less exposure to diversity. This can contribute to growing social and political divisions and tensions in Euro-
pean societies. 
BOX 7:  EXPLORING TECHNOLOGICAL CERTAINTIES – THE LINK BETWEEN ADVANCES IN 
COMMUNICATIONS TECHNOLOGY AND LEVELS OF MIGRATION
As growing numbers of people across the globe gain access to sophisticated communications technologies, 
there is a potential for migration flows to increase.
By Mary Harper, Africa Editor, BBC World Service
Anecdotal evidence suggests modern communications technology, especially social media, plays a key role in 
encouraging migration. Those who have already arrived in host countries often exaggerate their ‘successes’ when 
posting on social media, leading populations at home to believe their lives will dramatically improve if they migrate. 
Mobile phones and social media platforms are used by traffickers to demand payments and make threats, and by 
migrants sharing information about the best migration routes to follow. Interviews conducted in Eritrea, Ethiopia, 
Somalia, Somaliland and in diaspora communities suggest younger migrants use Snapchat and Instagram while 
older ones use Facebook. Online messaging and calling applications, such as WhatsApp, Skype, Imo, Viber and 
Telegram, are also popular with migrants and would-be migrants, particularly those with end-to-end encryption. As 
internet penetration increases globally and the cost of data falls, messaging related to migration is likely to grow, 
potentially leading to increased population flows. However, modern communications technology can also be used 
for messaging which informs about the risks associated with migration as long as it is presented in attractive and 
convincing form. Traditional and social media has also played a central role in shaping usually negative attitudes 
towards migration in host countries, although it can be used to present positive stories about migrants too. Repres-
sive governments will continue to try to block populations from using communications technologies, but this is likely 
to have limited effectiveness as people usually find crafty ways of bypassing such restrictions.
9 Peri-urbanisation is urban transition in the hybrid space in-between urban areas and rural hinterlands.
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TABLE 1: RELATIVE CERTAINTIES FOR MIGRATION BY 2030
EU
Demographic
certainties
• Fertility rates across the EU will remain below the replacement level.
• Ageing of EU societies will continue.
• Life expectancy will continue to grow.
• Shrinking labour force in many EU member states is likely to impede economic growth.
Social certainties • Demand for health and elderly care services will expand.
•  Ethnic and cultural diversity will grow but remain unevenly distributed between and within EU 
countries.
•  Certain parts of population will continue to resist growth in ethnic and cultural diversity 
(especially those in more ethnically homogenous areas).
• Popular concerns around national identity and culture will gain even more importance.
• Density of cross-border social and family ties will continue to grow.
Technological  
certainties
• Digital divide will narrow down but still persist.
• New risks associated with hacking and cyberterrorism will emerge.
• Border management will increasingly rely on a range of technological solutions.
Political certainties • The importance of new political players alongside traditional political parties will grow.
• Security and tackling of terrorism will remain high on the political agenda.
• Political significance of migration will further grow.
• Conflicts and instability in the European neighbourhood will continue.
Environmental  
certainties
• Global mean temperature will increase.
• More high-impact weather events (floods, droughts, wild fires, landslides) will take place.
•  Health impacts and losses to productivity related to heatwaves and epidemics of some 
infectious diseases will be more severe.
Economic certainties •  Automation and digitalisation will impact labour markets and particularly affect low and 
medium-qualified workers.
•  Proportion of workers in stable and permanent employment will decrease while precarious 
working conditions will affect more people.
•  Skills shortages will result from the shrinking pool of university graduates between 2017 and 2030.
Non-EU: Africa, Asia & Eastern European neighbourhood 10
Demographic
certainties
•  Population growth and youth bulges will persist in North and sub-Saharan Africa, South Asia and 
the Middle East.
• Ageing and shrinking of labour force in China, Japan and Korea will continue.
•  Demographic imbalances in countries with higher proportion of men (e.g. China, India) will 
persist.
• Population decline and ageing in Eastern European neighbourhood will continue.
Social certainties •  Increasing access to education will give rise to aspirations among young people (e.g. quality of 
life, professional fulfilment).
• Urbanisation will continue and intensify in some parts of the world.
• Demand for health and elderly care services in Eastern European neighbourhood will grow.
• Density of cross-border social and family ties will continue to grow.
Technological  
certainties
• Access to internet and communication technologies will grow.
• There will be more technology and innovation hubs with global impact (e.g. in China).
• Digital divide will narrow but still persist.
Political certainties •  Areas of ongoing and new political instability in certain regions (North Africa and some 
countries in parts of sub-Saharan Africa, Middle East) will persist.
• Democratic transitions in will take place in some African countries.
• Growing number of refugees will be stuck in protracted refugee situations.
• Russia will continue to try to extend its influence in Eastern Europe and the Balkans.
Environmental  
certainties
• Global mean temperature will increase.
•  Droughts, floods, hurricanes and other natural hazards will grow in prevalence and will be 
particularly devastating for urban centres in coastal areas.
• Levels of food insecurity in different regions will grow.
•  Health impacts and losses to productivity related to heatwaves and epidemics of some 
infectious diseases will be more severe.
Economic certainties •  Automation and digitalisation will impact labour markets and particularly affect low and 
medium-qualified workers.
• High levels of informal employment will persist.
• Fluctuations in oil prices will continue.
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EU
Demographic
certainties
• Fertility rates across the EU will remain below the replacement level.
• Ageing of EU societies will continue.
• Life expectancy will continue to grow.
• Shrinking labour force in many EU member states is likely to impede economic growth.
Social certainties • Demand for health and elderly care services will expand.
•  Ethnic and cultural diversity will grow but remain unevenly distributed between and within EU 
countries.
•  Certain parts of population will continue to resist growth in ethnic and cultural diversity 
(especially those in more ethnically homogenous areas).
• Popular concerns around national identity and culture will gain even more importance.
• Density of cross-border social and family ties will continue to grow.
Technological  
certainties
• Digital divide will narrow down but still persist.
• New risks associated with hacking and cyberterrorism will emerge.
• Border management will increasingly rely on a range of technological solutions.
Political certainties • The importance of new political players alongside traditional political parties will grow.
• Security and tackling of terrorism will remain high on the political agenda.
• Political significance of migration will further grow.
• Conflicts and instability in the European neighbourhood will continue.
Environmental  
certainties
• Global mean temperature will increase.
• More high-impact weather events (floods, droughts, wild fires, landslides) will take place.
•  Health impacts and losses to productivity related to heatwaves and epidemics of some 
infectious diseases will be more severe.
Economic certainties •  Automation and digitalisation will impact labour markets and particularly affect low and 
medium-qualified workers.
•  Proportion of workers in stable and permanent employment will decrease while precarious 
working conditions will affect more people.
•  Skills shortages will result from the shrinking pool of university graduates between 2017 and 2030.
FOOTNOTE 9 FOR TABLE10
10 These are regions that have traditionally been the main sources of immigrants coming to the EU. Eastern European neighbourhood includes non-EU 
countries in Eastern Europe and the Balkans.
Non-EU: Africa, Asia & Eastern European neighbourhood 10
Demographic
certainties
•  Population growth and youth bulges will persist in North and sub-Saharan Africa, South Asia and 
the Middle East.
• Ageing and shrinking of labour force in China, Japan and Korea will continue.
•  Demographic imbalances in countries with higher proportion of men (e.g. China, India) will 
persist.
• Population decline and ageing in Eastern European neighbourhood will continue.
Social certainties •  Increasing access to education will give rise to aspirations among young people (e.g. quality of 
life, professional fulfilment).
• Urbanisation will continue and intensify in some parts of the world.
• Demand for health and elderly care services in Eastern European neighbourhood will grow.
• Density of cross-border social and family ties will continue to grow.
Technological  
certainties
• Access to internet and communication technologies will grow.
• There will be more technology and innovation hubs with global impact (e.g. in China).
• Digital divide will narrow but still persist.
Political certainties •  Areas of ongoing and new political instability in certain regions (North Africa and some 
countries in parts of sub-Saharan Africa, Middle East) will persist.
• Democratic transitions in will take place in some African countries.
• Growing number of refugees will be stuck in protracted refugee situations.
• Russia will continue to try to extend its influence in Eastern Europe and the Balkans.
Environmental  
certainties
• Global mean temperature will increase.
•  Droughts, floods, hurricanes and other natural hazards will grow in prevalence and will be 
particularly devastating for urban centres in coastal areas.
• Levels of food insecurity in different regions will grow.
•  Health impacts and losses to productivity related to heatwaves and epidemics of some 
infectious diseases will be more severe.
Economic certainties •  Automation and digitalisation will impact labour markets and particularly affect low and 
medium-qualified workers.
• High levels of informal employment will persist.
• Fluctuations in oil prices will continue.
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TABLE 2: RELATIVE UNCERTAINTIES FOR MIGRATION BY 2030
EU
Demographic
uncertainties
• The level of success in tackling non-communicable diseases
• The effects of and responses to population decline
Social  
uncertainties
• Levels of welfare and education spending 
• Public response to growing cultural and ethnic diversity
• The level of success in transforming education systems, retraining and life-long learning
• Inequality within and across Member States (class, gender, ethnic, residence status)
• Levels of liberalism versus conservatism in relation to family, gender and sexuality
•  The role of media and social media in particular in shaping public and political response to 
migration
• The nature, presence, and role of the transnational community and diaspora networks
Technological  
uncertainties
•  Speed and social and regulatory acceptance of automation and digitalisation and their impact 
on labour demand
•  The level of success and acceptance of technologies for alternative energy production and its 
impacts on labour demand
• Developments and acceptance of technologies that facilitate teleworking and outsourcing
•  Developments in technologies that further facilitate transnational social and family ties: from 
communication technologies to transfer of money and goods
Political  
uncertainties
• The extent and form of EU integration
• The role of cities and the shape of multi-level governance
• Levels of xenophobia, islamophobia and racism
• Levels of violent extremism and its political repercussions
• EU member states’ military engagement around the world
• Levels of spending and target groups of European development aid and investment
• On-the-ground impact of international efforts to cooperate in migration management
Environmental  
uncertainties
• The level of investment into tackling the roots and effects of climate change 
•  The level of resilience of EU coastal cities faced with sea level rises and heightened risks from 
coastal storms and floods 
• Shape and speed of the transition to green technology and energy production
• Levels of adaptability of different populations to climate change
• Sudden and irreversible changes in the climate
• Sudden collapse of ecosystems and ecosystem services
• Sudden onset of high-impact weather events
Economic 
uncertainties
• The level of economic growth 
• Structure of the labour demand
• Effects of trade deals with the rest of the world
• Access to resources, especially energy
• The need to import labour
Non-EU: Africa, Asia & Eastern European neighbourhood 
Demographic
uncertainties
• The level of success in tackling non-communicable diseases
• The speed of decline in fertility rates
Social  
uncertainties
• Levels of welfare and education spending 
• Access to quality education and social security
• Levels of extreme poverty
• Inequality within and across countries (class, gender, ethnic, residence status)
• Levels of liberalism versus conservatism in relation to family, gender and sexuality
• Erosion of traditional cultures vs. strengthening or retrenchment of traditional cultures
• The role of media and social media in particular in shaping public and political responses to migration
• The nature, presence, and role of the transnational community and diaspora networks
Technological  
uncertainties
• Speed and social acceptance of automation and digitalisation and their impact on labour demand
• The extent of the digital divide 
• The level of radical innovation and leapfrogging
• Developments in agricultural technologies and water management
•  Developments in technologies that further facilitate transnational social and family ties: from 
communication technologies to transfer of money and goods
• Increased use of technology for education (increased access, expanded reach)
• Perceived credibility of information gained from social media
Political  
uncertainties
• Levels of regional cooperation and governance
• Russia’s and China’s involvement in conflicts and the potential of EU and the U.S. involvement
• Continued democratisation 
• The level of democratisation versus shift towards dictatorship in different parts of the world
• Outcomes of conflict resolution and reconstruction efforts in conflict-stricken regions
• Emergence of new conflicts
• Levels of corruption
• Violent extremism and its impact on general insecurity
• On-the-ground impact of international efforts to cooperate in migration management
• Levels of spending and target groups of development aid
• Levels of youth engagement in political developments
Environmental  
uncertainties
• The level of investment into tackling the roots and effects of climate change 
• The size of population displaced and/or trapped by the effects of environmental change
• The outcomes of the coincidence of environmental hazards and state fragility in some countries
• Shape and speed of the transition to green technology and energy production
• Levels of adaptability of different populations to climate change
• Sudden and irreversible climate changes
• Sudden collapse of ecosystems and ecosystem services
• Sudden onset of high-impact weather events
Economic 
uncertainties
• The level of economic growth 
• Structure of the labour demand
• Effects of trade deals with the rest of the world
• Investment in food production, especially in Africa
• Levels of industrialisation and economic diversification in African countries
• Access to land and the persistence of customary land tenure
• Access to finance and financial literacy
• Access to insurance schemes (e.g. of crops)
• Access to electricity
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EU
Demographic
uncertainties
• The level of success in tackling non-communicable diseases
• The effects of and responses to population decline
Social  
uncertainties
• Levels of welfare and education spending 
• Public response to growing cultural and ethnic diversity
• The level of success in transforming education systems, retraining and life-long learning
• Inequality within and across Member States (class, gender, ethnic, residence status)
• Levels of liberalism versus conservatism in relation to family, gender and sexuality
•  The role of media and social media in particular in shaping public and political response to 
migration
• The nature, presence, and role of the transnational community and diaspora networks
Technological  
uncertainties
•  Speed and social and regulatory acceptance of automation and digitalisation and their impact 
on labour demand
•  The level of success and acceptance of technologies for alternative energy production and its 
impacts on labour demand
• Developments and acceptance of technologies that facilitate teleworking and outsourcing
•  Developments in technologies that further facilitate transnational social and family ties: from 
communication technologies to transfer of money and goods
Political  
uncertainties
• The extent and form of EU integration
• The role of cities and the shape of multi-level governance
• Levels of xenophobia, islamophobia and racism
• Levels of violent extremism and its political repercussions
• EU member states’ military engagement around the world
• Levels of spending and target groups of European development aid and investment
• On-the-ground impact of international efforts to cooperate in migration management
Environmental  
uncertainties
• The level of investment into tackling the roots and effects of climate change 
•  The level of resilience of EU coastal cities faced with sea level rises and heightened risks from 
coastal storms and floods 
• Shape and speed of the transition to green technology and energy production
• Levels of adaptability of different populations to climate change
• Sudden and irreversible changes in the climate
• Sudden collapse of ecosystems and ecosystem services
• Sudden onset of high-impact weather events
Economic 
uncertainties
• The level of economic growth 
• Structure of the labour demand
• Effects of trade deals with the rest of the world
• Access to resources, especially energy
• The need to import labour
Non-EU: Africa, Asia & Eastern European neighbourhood 
Demographic
uncertainties
• The level of success in tackling non-communicable diseases
• The speed of decline in fertility rates
Social  
uncertainties
• Levels of welfare and education spending 
• Access to quality education and social security
• Levels of extreme poverty
• Inequality within and across countries (class, gender, ethnic, residence status)
• Levels of liberalism versus conservatism in relation to family, gender and sexuality
• Erosion of traditional cultures vs. strengthening or retrenchment of traditional cultures
• The role of media and social media in particular in shaping public and political responses to migration
• The nature, presence, and role of the transnational community and diaspora networks
Technological  
uncertainties
• Speed and social acceptance of automation and digitalisation and their impact on labour demand
• The extent of the digital divide 
• The level of radical innovation and leapfrogging
• Developments in agricultural technologies and water management
•  Developments in technologies that further facilitate transnational social and family ties: from 
communication technologies to transfer of money and goods
• Increased use of technology for education (increased access, expanded reach)
• Perceived credibility of information gained from social media
Political  
uncertainties
• Levels of regional cooperation and governance
• Russia’s and China’s involvement in conflicts and the potential of EU and the U.S. involvement
• Continued democratisation 
• The level of democratisation versus shift towards dictatorship in different parts of the world
• Outcomes of conflict resolution and reconstruction efforts in conflict-stricken regions
• Emergence of new conflicts
• Levels of corruption
• Violent extremism and its impact on general insecurity
• On-the-ground impact of international efforts to cooperate in migration management
• Levels of spending and target groups of development aid
• Levels of youth engagement in political developments
Environmental  
uncertainties
• The level of investment into tackling the roots and effects of climate change 
• The size of population displaced and/or trapped by the effects of environmental change
• The outcomes of the coincidence of environmental hazards and state fragility in some countries
• Shape and speed of the transition to green technology and energy production
• Levels of adaptability of different populations to climate change
• Sudden and irreversible climate changes
• Sudden collapse of ecosystems and ecosystem services
• Sudden onset of high-impact weather events
Economic 
uncertainties
• The level of economic growth 
• Structure of the labour demand
• Effects of trade deals with the rest of the world
• Investment in food production, especially in Africa
• Levels of industrialisation and economic diversification in African countries
• Access to land and the persistence of customary land tenure
• Access to finance and financial literacy
• Access to insurance schemes (e.g. of crops)
• Access to electricity
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BOX 8:  EXPLORING ENVIRONMENTAL UNCERTAINTIES – THE LINK BETWEEN MIGRATION AND 
ENVIRONMENTAL CHANGE
It is impossible to predict future migration outcomes as a direct response to environmental change because 
environmental change is never a single pressure and because we cannot know for certain how individuals 
and households at risk and governments will perceive and respond to such changes. This applies both to how 
environmental change will impact origin and destination regions and economies.
By Dominic Kniveton, Professor of Climate Change and Society, University of Sussex
Rather than looking at how environmental change influences mobility, it may be more sensible to identify what fac-
tors drive and influence particular migration flows and to estimate how sensitive these drivers are to environmental 
change.11 Such an approach allows the identification of longer (more indirect) causal changes between migration 
and the environment. Furthermore, migration flows are also influenced by individual and household migration beha-
viour, attitudes and their impact on other households’ perception of both the risks they face and mobility options 
they have.12 Accounting for the emergence that this and other feedbacks in the migration process (such as changes 
in migration policies) cause, is important for understanding the conditions under which mass migrations may or 
may not occur. The occurrence of rapid mass displacements that might arise from acute livelihood and security 
shocks, which are themselves in turn, sensitive to environmental variability and change, is of particular concern 
and uncertainty.
One of the key insights of the foresight report from the UK Government Office for Science (The Government Office 
for Science 2011) was the identification of so-called ‘trapped populations’. These populations were defined as being 
comprised of impoverished people that face a ‘double set of risks’ by being both unable to move away from envi-
ronmental threats and especially exposed and vulnerable to their impacts. The acknowledgment of the existence of 
such populations points to the need to consider both environmental variability and change pushing people to move, 
as well as forcing them to stay in locations exposed to the impacts of natural hazards. In particular it is likely that 
such populations will be found in expanding slums in urban areas of low-income countries where exposure to envi-
ronmental risks tends to be high and protective governance low. Although being ‘trapped’ has been readily accepted 
as a concept and has gained some traction in policy circles, the identification and definition of trapped populations 
has received less critical examination. As noted by Black et al. (2013), it is ‘difficult to distinguish, either concep-
tually or in practice, between those who stay where they are because they choose to and those whose immobility 
is in some way involuntary’ (pS36). For example, when unpacking the notion of being ‘trapped’ it is sensible to ask 
whether it should be extended to people who do not see migration as an optimal solution to environmental or any 
other stresses and shocks as well as to those who do not perceive the risks they are facing as demanding a mobility 
response.
11 For a comprehensive framework for assessing environmental determinants of migration see also Black et al. (2011).
12 This is further elaborated by Kniveton et al. (2012).
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BOX 9:   EXPLORING ECONOMIC UNCERTAINTIES – THE STRUCTURE OF LABOUR DEMAND AND THE 
ROLE OF TECHNOLOGY
By Simona Vezzoli, Postdoctoral Researcher, Faculty of Social and Behavioural Sciences, University of Amsterdam
It is relatively certain that by 2030, European societies will have a combination of aged population, high dependen-
cy ratios and strained pension and welfare systems. Solutions such as raising the retirement age will not resolve 
the long-term labour demand, both in the high and low skilled labour markets. Past strategies to address labour 
shortages have included encouraging women’s labour participation, the recruitment of foreign labour and increase 
in labour productivity. We might see these solutions re-proposed as women’s labour participation continues to be 
lower than men’s (in 2015, 64.3 per cent of all 20 to 64-year-old women in comparison to 75.9 per cent of all 
men in the same age group for the EU 28)13 and schemes to attract particular types of foreign workers may be 
introduced.
The future structure of the EU labour market and the specific labour demand are dependent on a wide range of 
factors, among which are: sectors driving the economy, the offshoring of industrial and service sector operations, 
the availability of relevant skills in the national labour force, the advancements of labour mechanization as well 
as employment benefits, healthy working conditions and foreign workforce policies. Furthermore, the provision of 
high quality programmes enabling workers to adapt to changing economies by promoting skills in demand and the 
accessibility of this training to workers within the country and abroad is linked to the uncertainty of the availability 
of the necessary skills. 
The push for labour-replacing technology to substitute (migrant) labour14 
While advancing technology is a relative certainty, it is unclear how our lives might be affected, in particular our 
work lives. What technology has done for work has been revolutionary, enabling rapid transfer of files, financial 
transfers as well as telecommuting, virtual meetings and the possibility of work re-entering the private space of the 
family as it did in pre-industrial times. Technology developers envision that other daily functions will be similarly 
revolutionized. Examples include driverless cars, 3D printing, robotics for personal care (which are already beco-
ming a reality in Japan) and army robots, among others. Technological innovation affecting production and service 
systems will be influenced by technical feasibility, costs of technology, benefits of automation and regulatory 
and social acceptance. Central to the relationship with migration policy will be the supply or shortage of workers, 
their skill levels and labour productivity. Labour-replacing automation will, therefore, be affected by interrelations 
between government priorities and labour migration policies. 
13 Eurostat, ‘Employment Statistics’ <http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/statistics-explained/index.php/Employment_statistics>  [accessed 21 March 2017].
14 For a 2018 JRC report on the topic see Biagi et al. (2018).
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4. FUTURE MIGRATION SCENARIOS
15 Similar axes were used in the foresight projects by the OECD and UK Foresight that we were drawing on.
16 Hein de Haas, Simona Vezzoli and Ayla Bonfiglio from the International Migration Institute, https://www.imi.ox.ac.uk/completed-projects/gmf 
17 Non-EU countries include the European Union neighbourhood (non-EU Eastern Europe, North Africa and the Middle East), sub-Saharan Africa and Asia.
18 http://publications.jrc.ec.europa.eu/repository/bitstream/JRC111538/kjnb29060enn.pdf
From the list of relative certainties and uncertainties, 
we constructed a set of four possible scenarios for 
what the future of migration in Europe could look like 
by 2030 (see Figure 1 below). The scenarios are built 
around two axes that represent two major areas of 
uncertainties that are crucial for migration outcomes. 
The horizontal axis refers to the level of international 
cooperation in key policy areas affecting migration 
and the degree to which local governance of political, 
social and economic matters is inclusive or exclusive 
of underprivileged groups of the population. We 
assume that a more cooperative governance style at 
the international level also tends to be more inclusive 
at the local level. The vertical axis represents the level 
of economic convergence or divergence between OECD 
and non-OECD countries.15 
The scenarios presented in this section are not 
predictions of the future. In their development, we built 
on existing scenario reports carried out by the OECD 
(2016), the UK Government Office for Science (2011) 
and under the Global Migration Futures project (2009-
2013).16 These exercises were carried out over longer 
period of time and involved larger numbers of experts 
and discussions. They arrived at broadly similar 
results – hence the choice for us to build on and further 
develop these existing scenarios rather than running our 
own scenario development process from scratch. In this 
way, we could structure our debates with a small group 
of experts around an already prepared list of certainties 
and uncertainties and scenario narratives. The final 
versions of the scenarios were deemed plausible by 
these and other experts and stakeholders with whom 
we engaged during the course of the project.
We tried to find different ways of putting the scenarios 
to practical use that would outlive both the duration 
of the project and the usual ‘shelf life’ of a report. This 
is why we kept the big-picture scenarios general and 
brief so that they can serve as a basis for developing 
tools and engagement methods to generate insightful 
discussions. 
The scenarios open up debates about different 
constellations of more and less certain future 
developments and possible actions that could be 
taken today in order to prepare for processes that can 
emerge from these constellations. It is, therefore, most 
useful to consider the four scenarios as a whole and 
discuss them in comparison with one another. Such a 
holistic view enables us to think through how different 
drivers could play out and interact with one another 
under different global political and economic contexts.
4.1. The big-picture 
scenarios and the 
implications for migration 
by 2030
In this section, we present a more detailed, 
chronological overview of the big-picture scenarios 
followed by insights from thematic and geographical 
‘zoom-ins’ that emerged from our collaboration with 
experts who used the broad scenarios to dig deeper 
into specific topics.
Figures 2-5 outline various developments leading up 
to 2030. They are presented in five-year timeframes 
for the EU and non-EU countries.17 We also include 
broad implications for migration of these scenarios. 
A one-page detailed overview of all four scenarios 
to be printed in A3 format can be found among the 
Migration discussion toolkit elements.18 
When used to stimulate debates, the presentation 
of the scenarios can be accompanied by a series of 
questions. The participants are encouraged to read/
listen to the scenario with these questions in mind 
as a way to engage them and prompt them to think 
through the consequences of alternative futures.
1. Will there be more or less migration in this 
scenario? Of what kind? In what directions?
2. Who will be the key institutional players influencing 
migration governance?
3. Will there be clear winners and losers in this 
scenario? Who could that be and why?
4. What are the key policy initiatives and directions 
that could enhance or reverse this scenario?
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Economic growth and strong global 
collaboration create more inclusive but 
also more diverse societies.
International cooperation is at its lowest. 
Despite technological progress, social 
inequalities are on the rise, stirring 
unrest and forced migration around the 
world. 
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Economic crisis creates patches of 
instability, but international 
collaboration allows for some progress 
in global migration management. 
Economic convergence is not matched 
with social progress, giving way to rising 
inequality, xenophobia and isolationism 
in Europe and the neighbourhood.
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FIGURE 2: CRISIS WITH COLLABORATION: SCENARIO DEVELOPMENT TOWARDS 2030
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FIGURE 3: INCLUSIVE GROWTH: SCENARIO DEVELOPMENT TOWARDS 2030
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FIGURE 4: SLOW GROWTH AND FRAGMENTATION: SCENARIO DEVELOPMENT TOWARDS 2030 
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FIGURE 5: SHOCKS, INEQUALITY AND CONTROL: SCENARIO DEVELOPMENT TOWARDS 2030
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4.2. Scenario implications 
for specific policy areas
To test whether the big-picture scenarios are capable 
of generating a future-oriented debate on specific 
policy areas, we organised three thematic focus groups 
with six to eight experts around the following EU 
policies: 
• Foreign policy and external action
• Labour market and welfare policy
• Immigrant integration policies
These sessions had the same format each time: to set 
the scene, the current state-of-play on the topic was 
introduced in a 15-minute presentation by an invited 
expert. This was followed by a brief presentation of 
the 2030 scenarios. We then asked the participants 
to place themselves in 2030 and discuss how each 
scenario might challenge or impact the respective 
policy area and together we considered possible 
implications for migration in the EU under each future 
scenario. Below, we present the main highlights of 
these discussions and interesting horizontal questions 
that emerged.
19 A fundamental principle of international law that forbids a country receiving asylum seekers from returning them to a country in which they would be 
in danger of persecution based on race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion.
4.2.1. EU foreign policy, external action and 
external policies
Key insights from the debate
•  If the collaborative scenarios are to result in stronger 
and more inclusive governance structures, diasporas 
will need to have a bigger say in policies of destination 
countries.
•  More equal partnership relations with third countries 
(perhaps with the EU no longer having an upper hand 
in these relations) could lead to easier negotiations of 
readmission agreements.
•  More collaboration does not necessarily mean more 
progressive governance. By 2030, there could also 
be enough momentum for a joint push to reinterpret 
international law in order to facilitate containment of 
migrants and refugees and to speed up their returns to 
countries of origin or transit. This could be done by, for 
example, abolishing the non-refoulement19 principle or 
by reinterpreting the 1951 Geneva Convention relating 
to the Status of Refugees and the related Protocol.
Current state of play 
By Rosa Balfour, Senior Fellow at the German Marshall 
Fund of the US
The EU’s global outreach remains uneven. It is still 
underdeveloped as a political actor on the international 
scene but nonetheless a key player in trade and 
economic terms, and of some normative significance 
at the multilateral level. Geographic proximity 
determines the degree and depth of EU engagement, 
as well as the histories and ties of relations at the 
national level. Over the past few years, the EU has 
attempted to strengthen its international identity with 
the elaboration of some policy preferences, through for 
example the EU’s Global Strategy. Britain’s departure 
from the EU is likely to negatively impact the EU’s 
ability to become a global player though the region is 
contributing to modest (and potentially insignificant) 
political commitments towards security defence 
cooperation. 
The EU’s ability to influence international developments 
remains deeply volatile and dependent on events 
determined elsewhere, including on issues which 
have direct consequences for EU affairs, including on 
migration patterns. Migration patterns are increasingly 
shaping preferences with impacts on several areas of 
international activity, showing a strong vulnerability 
to domestic politics shaping external engagement. 
How the U.S., Russia, Turkey, Saudi Arabia behave 
shapes and constrains Europe’s choices. In this regard, 
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so long as the EU’s role in conflict prevention and 
mediation is curbed by the predominance of other 
powers in global governance, the continent is likely 
to continue being at the receiving end of trends it 
cannot influence. Instability and conflict in the EU’s 
neighbourhood and sub-Saharan Africa have all 
caused population movements towards Europe. Indeed, 
the political crisis of 2015-2016 which saw a major 
breakdown in solidarity within the EU and a pushback 
against the European Commission’s assertion of its 
competences was triggered by the arrival of mixed 
flows of migrants, the great majority of which were 
refugees fleeing wars or conflict-driven insecurity 
which European states had not been able to contain or 
de-escalate (Syria, Afghanistan in primis). 
Emerging EU external migration policies are showing 
a growing dependence on domestic politics. EU 
migration policy can limit the EU’s ability to influence 
international events, making the EU vulnerable to the 
preferences of other actors. For instance, the priority 
accorded by the EU to rely on Turkey’s cooperation 
in dealing with refugees from Syria has curtailed the 
EU’s ability to influence Ankara’s policies in Syria and 
towards the Kurdish question. Domestic politics is also 
changing the nature of the EU’s development policy, 
which now has a stronger emphasis on migration-
related issues and on security sector cooperation to 
enable third states to better control their borders. 
Finally, the EU’s budget for humanitarian relief to 
support populations hit by conflict and other natural 
and man-made disasters has increased enormously in 
recent years.
The EU still struggles to achieve coherence between 
external policies, despite the double role the High 
Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs 
and Security Policy has as a Vice President of the 
European Commission. The external impact of internal 
policies, such as the Common Agricultural Policy or 
the Fisheries Policy, can sometimes contrast with 
other political objectives. The relationship between 
the EU and Morocco, for example, is shaped by the 
shared interest both parties have in maintaining and 
upgrading their fisheries agreement, which the EU is 
also normatively tied to and ensuring that these do 
not negatively affect the situation in Western Sahara. 
The European Court of Justice is currently dealing 
with a complaint from the Western Sahara campaign. 
Similarly, increasing food safety standards in the EU 
can impact on third countries which depend on access 
to the EU market for their agricultural products.
These examples show how the external impact of 
internal EU policies can have unintended consequences 
on the livelihoods of many employed in these sectors 
in third countries. Indirectly, changes in sources of 
domestic product can lead to population movements 
in search of better opportunities. While development 
aid is increasingly geared towards supporting local 
economic growth, other EU policies may not be 
dovetailed to that end. More research connecting the 
linkages between the impacts of different policies is 
needed.
Table 3 below presents the main implications for the 
development of the EU’s foreign policy and external 
action efforts in each of the four scenarios.
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SCENARIO 1: CRISIS WITH COLLABORATION
• EU to play a coordination role on restrictions and containment of migration flows
• Tensions between inward- and outward-looking Member States
• Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) based on piecemeal cooperation
• European external action carried out through trade and development
• Outsourcing of migration management to third countries enhanced
SCENARIO 2: INCLUSIVE GROWTH
• Less conditionality and more partnership in EU’s dealing with third countries 
• Focus on circular migration and regularisation of labour migration
•  Development-oriented partnerships with third countries more emphasis on the benefits of migration as part of 
development
• Stronger CFSP cooperation amongst Member States
• Diasporas have a bigger say in EU destination countries
• Readmissions agreements are easier to conclude
SCENARIO 3: SLOW GROWTH AND FRAGMENTATION
• Inward-looking trend in EU foreign policy dominates
• Divisions between the core EU states and the periphery
• Policy innovation exists but mostly at the level of Member States
• Focus on tackling irregular migration
•  Growth in smuggling and trafficking as political volatility in the EU neighbourhood grows and so do migration 
pressures
• EU becomes less attractive for highly-skilled immigrants
SCENARIO 4: SHOCKS, INEQUALITY AND CONTROL
• Minimal cooperation amongst Member States on foreign policy issues
• Limited collaboration on: border control, returns and externalisation of migration policies
•  Revisions of the fundamental principles of international law such as the ‘non-refoulement’20 principle or the 
right to asylum
HORIZONTAL QUESTIONS: 
•  Could increasing cooperation on defence, in response to a global rise in military expenditure, increase 
militarisation and consequently stimulate existing and new conflicts?
•  Can the EU achieve an external migration policy independently from its internal migration policy?
20 A fundamental principle of international law that forbids a country receiving asylum seekers from returning them to a country in which they would be in 
danger of persecution based on race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion. 
TABLE 3: WHAT COULD THE CONTEXT FOR EU FOREIGN POLICY AND EXTERNAL ACTION LOOK LIKE IN 2030 
IN DIFFERENT SCENARIOS?
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4.2.2. Labour market and welfare policies
Key insights from the debate
•  Contrary to common expectations, trade protectionism 
could lead to more migration by pushing up the demand 
for low-skilled labour in migration destination countries.
•  An introduction of the universal basic income and 
similar universal schemes can be politically difficult if 
migrants are perceived as receiving benefits without 
prior contribution. More evidence on the link between 
universal basic income schemes and public perceptions 
of migrants is needed to avoid feeding demand for 
migrants’ exclusion and the anti-immigrant sentiment 
among citizens.
Current state of play
By Alexandre Afonso, Assistant professor of public policy at 
Leiden University, Netherlands
Labour market and welfare policies remain largely the 
responsibility of the EU Member States rather than 
common European policies. However, together with patterns 
of future economic growth, labour market and welfare 
policies will matter greatly in shaping future migration 
within, from and towards Europe.21 Labour market policies 
are important indirect migration drivers since they affect 
the degree to which temporary recruitment of labour is 
possible, workers’ rights are protected, workplace abuses 
are prevented, and unauthorized labour is tolerated in 
practice. European welfare regimes also interact with 
migration, for example by raising different demands for 
foreign labour. The increasing demand for care workers has 
been a major factor in explaining the continued migration 
of regular and irregular (and increasingly female) workers 
towards some EU countries. Considering the ageing of 
the European population and growing demand for health 
and elderly care services, the need for such skills is likely 
to increase in the future. Debates about migration, labour 
markets and welfare are often framed by the assumption 
that welfare generosity attracts more migration and 
reduces immigrants’ incentives to participate in the labour 
market. However, existing evidence shows that welfare 
generosity reduces rather than increases the demand for 
low-skilled work and therefore can limit the number of 
foreign workers. There is also a lack of substantial evidence 
supporting the argument about welfare tourism. Access 
to work is a much stronger incentive for migration than 
welfare for both EU and non-EU migrants (Afonso & Devitt 
2016).
Table 4 below presents the main implications for the 
development of the EU’s labour market and welfare 
policies in each of the four scenarios.
21 The importance of the structure of labour demand in destination countries and the impact of welfare policies as drivers of European migrations are 
further elaborated in the project’s background study (de Haas 2018).
22 A set of four 2030 integration scenarios for the EU was also developed by Rainer Münz as part of an ESPAS Ideas Paper Series (Münz 2018).
4.2.3. Immigrant integration policies
Key insights from the debate
•  There is not a straightforward relationship between 
inclusive policies and positive integration outcomes. 
Integration will crucially depend on other policy areas 
such as labour markets and social security.
•  Across the scenarios, growing selectiveness in access to 
integration programmes is to be expected in the future 
with employers gaining a stronger voice as advocates 
for selective immigration and integration policies. This 
growing selectiveness needs to be complemented by 
mainstreaming of integration across policy areas to 
avoid social exclusion of other immigrant groups.
Current state of play
By Ilke Adam, Research Professor at the Institute for European 
Studies of the Free University in Brussel
Similar to labour-market and welfare policies, integration 
policies have also traditionally been the exclusive 
prerogative of EU Member States. In recent years, there has 
been a dispersion of authority over integration up-wards 
to the EU, down-wards to regions and cities and out-wards 
to non-governmental organisations and the private sector. 
At the EU level, there has also been a horizontal dispersion 
of governance illustrated by the increase in intra-service 
groups and emphasis on better cross-sector coordination. 
The EU strongly promotes ‘civic integration policies’, such 
as the provision of integration courses, through its funding 
mechanisms, currently in the form of the Asylum, Migration 
and Integration Fund (AMIF). However, after a decade of 
implementation, we lack clear evidence regarding the 
benefits of the courses and tests funded. Rather, the 
existing evidence shows that language acquisition and 
labour-market integration are not always better for those 
who followed integration courses than for those who did 
not. Research has also shown that too strict integration 
requirements (such as integration tests in exchange for 
stable residence permits) might actually hinder integration 
if they are used as a form of migration control. The 
complex relationship between inclusive policies and 
positive integration outcomes stems from the importance 
of other public policies such as labour market, welfare, 
education and citizenship which may have a higher impact 
on integration outcomes. Moreover, public perceptions of 
investments into immigrant integration can affect public 
confidence and reduce or expand political space for reform 
and policy innovation in this area (Adam & Caponio 2018).
Table 5 below presents the main implications for the 
development of the EU’s immigrant integration policies in 
each of the four scenarios.22 
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TABLE 4: WHAT COULD THE CONTEXT FOR LABOUR MARKET AND WELFARE POLICIES IN THE EU LOOK LIKE 
IN 2030 IN DIFFERENT SCENARIOS?
SCENARIO 1: CRISIS WITH COLLABORATION
• More limited access to social security but parts of the welfare system are regulated at the EU level
•  Decrease in welfare generosity but increase in coverage of different groups of workers (e.g. in the domestic 
and care sector dominated by migrant workers)
• Spending cuts in education and labour-market protection
• More emphasis on individual investment in reskilling
• The labour market becomes more segregated
SCENARIO 2: INCLUSIVE GROWTH
• Stronger links between economic growth and social aspects (e.g. in the European Semester)
•  Agreement on intra-EU transfers to Member States to compensate for costs related to inflows of immigrants
• EU social security accounts, common European benefits scheme
• More investment in inclusive education systems 
• More governance on EU labour market protection 
• Potential for nationalist backlash against ‘non-deserving’ immigrant beneficiaries 
SCENARIO 3: SLOW GROWTH AND FRAGMENTATION
• Preference for local workers and welfare chauvinism
• More conditionality for certain groups, including immigrants
• Growing social conservativism 
• Lack of investment in public services at the state level feeds anti-immigrant sentiment 
• No EU labour-market protection systems and collective bargaining mechanisms 
• EU cooperation only on necessary elements around the single market 
SCENARIO 4: SHOCKS, INEQUALITY AND CONTROL
• Less spending on education and social housing 
• More conditionality in access to welfare and the labour market for immigrants
• Trade protectionism could lead to more migration as the demand for low-skilled labour would grow
• More conditionality in immigration and integration policies
•  Investment in technology and new possibilities for remote work could decrease demand for longer-term 
migration of high- and medium-skilled workers 
• Decline in welfare chauvinism as more people emigrate from the EU
HORIZONTAL QUESTIONS: 
• Do more diverse societies necessarily need to be more unequal?
•  Could new welfare schemes such as universal basic income or EU-wide benefits create a popular demand for 
excluding non-citizens from access to benefits if they have not contributed to the national system prior to benefiting 
from it? Could they therefore inadvertently feed nationalist and populist tendencies in some Member States?
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TABLE 5: WHAT COULD THE CONTEXT FOR IMMIGRANT INTEGRATION POLICIES LOOK LIKE IN 2030 IN 
DIFFERENT SCENARIOS?
SCENARIO 1: CRISIS WITH COLLABORATION
•  There is space for reform and cooperation, including in the area of migration and integration
•  New opportunity for the EU to be a global player in tackling crises of global relevance: e.g. environmental 
displacement, supporting intra-regional migration in Africa
• EU initiates a new legal and institutional framework for integration of environmentally displaced populations
SCENARIO 2: INCLUSIVE GROWTH
• Systematic mainstreaming of integration across policy areas, especially into social inclusion
• More opportunities for larger-scale resettlement programmes
• More intra-EU competition for highly skilled immigrants
• More harmonization of integration policies at the EU level - also through the EU Pillar of Social rights 
•  Greater levels of mobility and diversity in the EU could impact the sense of collective belonging, which might 
have to be based on different criteria than national identity
SCENARIO 3: SLOW GROWTH AND FRAGMENTATION
• EU becomes less attractive as a destination
• Little space for EU-wide actions on integration
•  Legal migration channels and integration programmes become very selective and benefit the needs of some 
EU Member States only
• Migrants’ social and political rights are seriously curtailed
• Growing inequality among different groups of immigrants
• Little space for programmes supporting social cohesion among different disadvantaged groups
SCENARIO 4: SHOCKS, INEQUALITY AND CONTROL
• Little space for coordinated integration policies, rising tensions among disadvantaged groups
• Increased concentration of migrants in some cities, that can reap the benefits of immigration
• Growing urban – rural divide
•  Short-term increase of intra-EU mobility due to growing economic divergence but more obstacles to freedom 
of movement in the long term
• Employers become vocal advocates of selective integration
HORIZONTAL QUESTIONS: 
•  Could strengthened political and socio-economic rights for immigrants result in more inclusive policies in 
destination countries?
•  At the individual level, what if there is a gap between immigrants’ subjective perception of wellbeing and their 
socio-economic integration?
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4.3. Scenario implications 
for the EU, the EU 
neighbourhood, sub-
Saharan Africa and 
Southeast Asia
While the focus groups presented in the previous 
section dealt with possible scenario implications for EU 
policies linked to migration outcomes, we also asked 
experts involved in the project to consider how the 
scenarios would play out in and beyond the EU. Their 
insights focusing on the EU, the EU neighbourhood, 
sub-Saharan Africa and Southeast Asia are presented 
below (Boxes 10 – 13). 
Using the certainties and uncertainties identified for 
the different regions, the experts developed narratives 
for each of the scenarios about what the future could 
look like and what the implications for migration 
might be in different regional contexts. While the big 
picture scenarios offer a framework under which we 
can discuss different policy implications, the regional 
zoom-ins provide more detail and precision as to the 
four alternative futures. This kind of precision can 
be useful when discussing the various conditions 
and dynamics under which migration policymaking is 
formulated, the range of outcomes that are possible, 
and the interaction between these dynamics in 
different world regions. Furthermore, considering the 
scenario implications beyond the EU makes us realise 
how migration dynamics are shaped both in countries 
of origin and destination.
The regionally-specific scenario narratives presented 
below can be used to adjust and adapt the discussion 
tools from the Migration discussion toolkit included in 
the last part of this report.
4.3.1. General insights from the 
geographically-specific scenarios
Despite different political and economic parameters 
that distinguish the four future scenarios, some 
general trends emerge from the narratives and could 
be considered in debates about future policy priorities:
•  A situation in which EU Member States collaborate only 
on migration control measures and negotiate other 
elements of their migration and development policies 
bilaterally or in smaller groups of Member States 
emerges as a plausible future in multiple scenarios.
•  Lack of international collaboration on migration 
governance and sustainable development is likely to 
stimulate growth in irregular migration flows.
•  In a number of scenarios, the EU in 2030 is no longer 
amongst the most attractive destinations for migrants 
coming from the EU neighbourhood, sub-Saharan 
Africa and Southeast Asia because non-European 
regions will be in a position to offer better economic 
and social prospects to foreign workers and their 
families.
•  A combination of the economic and political rise of 
Middle Eastern powers and natural disasters caused 
by climate change in the EU neighbourhood could 
make the EU vulnerable to influxes of migrants, both 
refugees and irregular, incentivised and facilitated 
by the social networks with communities already 
established in EU countries.
•  In sub-Saharan Africa, inflows of various forms of 
capital from the diaspora need to be supported but 
also carefully managed. Such capital has the potential 
for disrupting social and economic opportunities for 
the “local” population and could give rise to internal 
political resistance against the political influence of the 
diaspora. 
•  In Southeast Asia, diaspora groups will be crucial in 
facilitating mobility of skilled workers across borders, 
as an increasing number of countries in the region will 
experience population decline and a shrinking labour 
force.
•  Unless the security situation and economic 
opportunities in cities significantly worsen, Southeast 
Asian countries will have to respond to the problems 
associated to rural depopulation.
 
37
 Future scenarios and tools to stimulate forward-looking discussions
4.3.2. 2030 in the European Union
BOX 10: 2030 SCENARIO IMPLICATIONS FOR THE EUROPEAN UNION
By Simona Vezzoli, Postdoctoral Researcher, Faculty of Social and Behavioural Sciences, University of Amsterdam
SCENARIO 1: CRISIS WITH COLLABORATION
In 2030 the European landscape is overall positive as the European Union not only has retained relevance but it 
has become a more cohesive union. Through its leaders’ strategic vision, the EU has continued to hold political and 
economic power in a changing international context where new emerging economic blocs have started to dominate. 
The EU has displayed strong cooperative efforts, solidarity and a desire for social inclusion, which has come as a 
surprise considering the deep internal divisions experienced in the late 2010s and early 2020s for both political and 
economic reasons, including escaping the collapse of the Schengen Area. 
While greater cooperative efforts are now (2030) widely accepted, the road has been rocky as, over the past decade, 
EU Member States have reacted to external and internal pressures expressing different preferences. While France and 
Germany fully supported EU consolidation in the late 2010s, other countries took a more cautious approach: Southern 
European countries remained committed to the EU project but firmly requested measures to reduce inequalities, while 
CEE countries showed diverse preferences with Poland standing with France and Germany and Bulgaria and Romania 
standing with Southern Europe. A general consensus arose on the need to improve the efficiency of the EU, which 
encouraged goodwill among most Member States and their willingness to financially support reforms, particularly EU-
level socio-economic reforms which have reduced intra-EU inequalities and limited social tensions. 
The growth of industry in green technologies and alternative energy sources has also been a stimulus for smaller 
scale initiatives both in the EU and abroad. The EU has not dominated this industry, but it has spearheaded 
innovative techniques thanks to R&D investment and the inflow of scientists and experts from other developed 
countries, mainly previously based in the US. While the investments initially aimed to find sustainable solutions 
to water scarcity in Southern Europe, similar needs in several countries – either needing energy sources or facing 
water scarcity and management issues – have sparked partnerships in North Africa and the Sahel region, reducing 
some of the long-term constraints to economic growth. 
The migration landscape is characterized by a dynamic migration system of high-skilled workers, including growing 
numbers of professionals from developing countries, but also some channels that allow the rapid entry of skilled 
and lower-skilled immigrants, including humanitarian cases, in the labour market. At the same time, we see the 
emergence of other migration systems that completely by-pass the EU, as other regions are similarly attempting 
to promote technology-driven economic growth through the immigration of highly skilled professionals as well as 
harnessing the talents of skilled migrants and individuals among the sizable displaced populations. 
Key developments that led to this scenario:
•  In 2020, while Member States consolidated their support behind the EU, the economy continued to be slow, albeit 
stable. The instability, growing inequalities within the EU and between the EU and other parts of the world stimulated 
contestations to neoliberal principles. Within the EU, these movements led to political adjustments as traditional 
parties sought to find new solutions to the deep socio-economic divisions within society.
•  The economic crisis led to low labour demand in certain sectors – industry and some services – and immediate 
pressure to constrain the entry of new foreign workers  
•  By 2025, Member States began their economic recovery, which was grounded on regional trade agreements with other 
advanced economies. 
•  In the EU, the social movements against globalization were placated as governments committed to improving social 
protection, particularly in the reinvestment into the wellbeing of all members of society, mainly the young and 
disadvantaged, but also catering to the needs of an ageing population. 
•  Service sectors to support high-skilled workers also grew and the chronic shortage of labour in the EU resulted in the 
renewed demand for labour.
•  In an attempt to prevent immigration to the EU, Member States renewed their commitment to Schengen and introduced 
new vetting procedures to restrict and contain immigration.  
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SCENARIO 2: INCLUSIVE GROWTH
By the early 2020s, social tensions in most EU Member States reached a point of no return. A handful of visionary 
political leaders, recognizing that the options were either to plunge into total chaos or try to offer real honest 
solutions to a politically disillusioned populace, started a new European movement focused on cooperation, social 
protection, justice and equality. Their movement, which came to be known as the European Renewal Movement 
(ERM), provided a new vision and inspiration for young and old to collaborate for a better society. ERM’s main 
achievement was the creation of the European Pillar of Social Rights. While terrorist attacks endured into the mid-
2020s, the sense of optimism towards a new inclusive rights-based social model led to a relatively fast weakening 
of the recruitment base of terrorist networks.
Businesses were central in pushing for the EU-wide recognition of education and professional qualifications of 
graduates with non-European degrees, which also facilitated the migration of highly skilled professionals, despite 
ongoing claims of ‘brain drain’ by origin countries. With the US losing some of its appeal as a leader in innovation, 
the EU gained attractiveness, although it is competing with other attractive destinations. Even for other types 
of migration, from displacement, skilled and low-skilled migration and irregular migration, the EU remains an 
attractive but not the sole potential destination. As a result, while migration management remains on the EU 
agenda, the stimulus for creating shared migration and integration policies has waned as Member States try to 
address the concerns of migrant populations through their general rights-based approach. Migration flows have 
also diversified not so much towards the EU but to other countries in the EU neighbourhood, which have seen 
sectors of their economies grow.
Key developments that led to this scenario:
•  By 2020, economic conditions began to improve, leading to increased labour demand, particularly in the green tech 
sector, which received large financing by the EU as well as individual Member States. 
•  Given growing global competition for workers by other high-growth countries, the EU developed the strategy to ‘recruit’ 
from countries where political tensions are making emigration desirable. 
•  The slow recovery from the economic crisis led to an impulse for immigration, particularly from lower-middle-income 
countries in the EU neighbourhood, e.g. Montenegro, as well as across the Mediterranean, e.g. Morocco, and beyond, 
e.g. Ethiopia, Senegal and Sri Lanka. Asylum seeking towards the EU decreased to a trickle as a result of a peaceful 
Middle East.
•  By 2025, the EU showed a thriving green tech industry centred in areas around cities like Berlin and Warsaw. Some 
tensions emerged as a result of the contrast between urbanites spreading into peri-urban and rural areas, particularly 
because of the higher cultural and ethnic diversity of urban dwellers. 
•  Governmental campaigns emphasized the European ethos of solidarity and cohesion in diversity through the appeal of 
food and music festivals, the support for the arts and other initiatives that introduce creative solutions to environmental 
and social challenges, e.g. urban renewal projects that rely on green technologies, recycling and promote community-
building. 
•  By 2025, the expectations of a growing migrant labour force were becoming a reality, affecting also peri-urban areas. 
This generated some social tensions among more homogeneous populations in Germany, Poland and Czechia. But 
the economic benefits generated by migrant workers, have rapidly rallied support for EU-level labour migration and 
integration schemes. 
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SCENARIO 3: SLOW GROWTH AND FRAGMENTATION
In 2030, there are attempts to rise above instinctive reactions to terrorism and to re-open the gaze to the outside. 
This approach, however, is limited to some of the Member States as cohesion among the EU Member States has 
suffered. It appears that the countries that opened to the world were influenced by three developments in particular: 
1. The expansion of the green technology industry, the impulse to trade, and human resource exchanges with other 
economic hubs, e.g. India, Indonesia and Eastern and Southern Africa; 2. Frequent rapid-onset environmental crises, 
such as flooding in coastal cities and in river valleys, e.g. in Skopje, Bosnia-Herzegovina, which are promoting a 
sense of solidarity as these events are hitting closer and closer to home and necessitate global solutions more 
than ever before; and 3. Growing cybercrime and the fact that both the sources of this threat and possible solutions 
seem to originate outside of the EU space.  
Demographic trends have continued as expected, with low fertility, longer life expectancies and a sizeable 65+ 
cohort. Continuous security threats have influenced the older generation, who have supported the entry into Member 
States’ governments of ultra-conservative parties that emphasized job access, social protection and publicly-funded 
social services only for natives and naturalized citizens. While much of these conservative values did not translate 
into actual policies, employers minimized the hiring of foreign workers. As they ‘grew apart’ Member States adopted 
various approaches to their labour market demands. In a few countries, e.g. Denmark, the Netherlands, Poland and 
Hungary, there was a conservative backlash as differentiated access to social services was established, depending 
on tax contributions and access for migrants only after a ‘probationary’ period. In other countries, such as Greece, 
Italy and Spain, governments attempted to retain universal coverages for health, unemployment and pensions. 
The EU Member States tried to hold on to the idea of a shared future but in fact several divisions emerged, 
often tied to social services, right to work and quality of life. Collaboration continued in the areas of security, 
protection from external attacks and, most recently in the fight against cybercrime threats. This resulted in different 
groups of Member States: some experiencing stronger economic conditions, greater employment opportunities and 
stability, some legal labour immigration channels but low social protection, particularly for non-natives and long-
term residents; and others where quality of life was centred around principles of social security and the pursuit of 
fulfilling work, but where these ‘benefits’ were reserved for natives, while being more restrictive for immigrants. In 
either case, Member States continued to be economically attractive for migrants, but less desirable in terms of social 
justice, particularly as China, India and Russia provide even more favourable economic opportunities. The sectors 
that continue to attract important numbers of foreign workers are health and care services, but not unlike the 1970’s 
guest-worker programmes, they intend to promote circulation and prevent long-term settlement of migrant. It has 
been mostly Eastern European countries that have begun to put pressure on having common migration policies as 
they seek to find viable solutions for their labour shortages. However, given the fragmented interests among the 
Member States, Eastern European countries have resorted to bilateral agreements promoting circular migration.
Key developments that led to this scenario:
•  In the 2020s, EU Member States struggled to relaunch their economies, particularly in Southern Europe, but also in 
Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland and France. 
•  In Southern Europe, high youth unemployment, combined with further austerity measures and cuts to welfare and 
education, led to grave social tensions. 
•  Combined with a surge in terrorist attacks, many Member States took a rapid turn toward conservative and inward-
looking policies, particularly aimed at making the population feel safe through insulation. 
•  Disagreements among Member States on the way forward led to different visions of the future of the Union and a 
gradual fragmentation of the EU, with the last entrants among the first ‘exiters’ in the 2020s. 
•  By 2025, there are important tensions between migrant and non-migrant communities, recurrent fears of large flows 
of displaced people due to environmental pressures and conflict in Africa and anxieties from the growing presence of 
populist parties in governments. 
•  The EU has rapidly lost appeal as a region of migration destination and much to the surprise of EU leadership, Europe 
has become a destination of last resort for asylum seekers and displaced population, who can still rely on the human 
rights approach that still survives in some EU Member States.
•  By 2025, the level of cooperation in finding a common approach towards migration was very low.
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SCENARIO 4: SHOCKS, INEQUALITY AND CONTROL
By 2030, Europe is characterized by a climate of great uncertainty. On the one hand there have been interesting 
developments with the emergence of leadership of cities like Berlin, the economic growth of certain Member States 
that invested heavily in R&D in technology, robotics and engineering; on the other hand, other Member States 
have stalled, unable to catch up with technological change and important setbacks have occurred in international 
cooperation, which have hampered efforts to deal with large numbers of people displaced by conflicts in Africa 
and Asia and to tackle massive cyberattacks. In 2030, the EU is fragmented: some countries collaborate with each 
other, i.e. Austria, Denmark and Hungary, as they try to protect and save their position, but they shun external 
collaboration. Their increased isolation is also linked to their decision to scale down reliance on automation both 
in the public and private spheres as a way to limit exposure to cyber threats. Others have embraced the idea of 
working as a global community to find sustainable solutions to climate and environmental issues, e.g. China has 
become a leader in funding high-tech solutions to flooding, and implement sustainable answers to population 
displacement for example, and even here China has been heavily involved given its need to relocate its population 
living in the coastal areas and it has worked in partnership with Russia, India, the US and a few African countries. 
In 2030, the EU project has failed overall, although some of its principles survive among those few Member States 
that have taken steps to move forward relying on some collaboration. There is growing interest among the forward-
looking Member States to move towards the reduction of EU membership. But the institutional fragmentation of 
the EU is not the only loss: it is disadvantaged people, the working classes and the vulnerable that have paid a high 
price through the changes of the last two decades. Furthermore, we have moved from talking about an EU labour 
market to reverting to discussions about individual Member States labour markets. Fortunately, the authorities 
of a few cities, sites of business ventures and economic growth, have instituted municipal level programmes and 
services, including education and language services for new arrivals, and have become attraction poles of both 
intra-EU migration and international migration.
Within the EU, borders have been reintroduced by the isolationist countries, which are keen on preventing most 
immigration, except for a few sectors in which skilled migrants are in demand. Continued uncertainties in the EU 
into the 2020s made the Member States less attractive than in past decades, even leading to return of irregular 
migrants and rejected asylum seekers unable to regularize their situation and less and less able to rely on access 
to the informal market as controls increased, including at the borders. Migration into the EU became accepted and 
regulated primarily in high tech, medical and health sectors, including mid-level experienced care sector as well 
as lower-skilled care provision. These migrants no longer enjoy freedom of movement within the EU and benefits 
previously enjoyed, such as rights to family reunification. These conditions made the EU less attractive to migrants, 
who could also consider other alternative destinations in emerging economies. 
Key developments that led to this scenario:
•  In 2020, the EU collaborative efforts, encouraged by a new group of political leaders in 2019, started to lose momentum 
as divergent interests and approaches emerged to deal with social divisions and terrorism, migration management 
issues and approaches to combat cybercrime. These divergent interests were associated with the fact that some 
Member States put their bets on a future led by technological progress, particularly centred in some attractive cities 
such as Berlin and Strasbourg, while others avoided outward openness, perceived as full of threats.
•  Protectionist policies hampered economic growth, rapidly enlarging government debt and the shrinking of welfare 
provisions by limiting the numbers of beneficiaries and putting needs of the native populations before those of 
migrants. This led to worsening social tensions. 
•  By 2025, investment in automation was preferred to more migration in order to avoid stimulating the growth of a strong 
support base for right-wing anti-immigration populist parties. Strong anti-immigration attitudes and failures to tackle 
environmental and security issues as global problems are main motives that lead to the progressive fragmentation of 
EU unity and to the first steps to be taken by the most conservative EU Member States towards an exit from the EU.
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4.3.3. 2030 in the EU neighbourhood
BOX 11: 2030 SCENARIO IMPLICATIONS FOR THE EU NEIGHBOURHOOD
By Rosa Balfour, Senior Fellow, German Marshall Fund of the US
SCENARIO 1: CRISIS WITH COLLABORATION
By 2030, Europe continues to be surrounded by a volatile neighbourhood. EU governance and its relations with 
Eastern Europe, the Balkans, North Africa and the Middle East remain based on a patchwork of slow enlargement, 
some trade agreements and deepening of relations with individual countries, accompanied by an enduring inability 
to influence authoritarian regimes and conflict in the neighbourhood. In addition, the EU seeks cooperation with 
neighbouring countries to contain the consequences of conflict further afield – hence Europe’s foreign policy is 
guided by a demand towards neighbouring countries to act as a buffer zone, limiting its ability to shape and 
influence positive change. However, additional spending on foreign policy ensures that the impact on Europe of 
the crises in neighbouring countries and beyond is relatively contained and does not fundamentally undermine 
the European project. 
In terms of migration, large numbers of North Africans seek refuge in Europe following political crises there 
(in politically fragile and/or demographically bulging countries such as Egypt), alongside irregular migrants and 
refugees from other parts of Africa. Only some could integrate into the needs of the labour market; others were 
deported thanks to the improved ability of European states to cooperate with third countries on returns and on 
delivering humanitarian support outside Europe and to a growth in demand for labour in non-European countries. 
Continued instability in the Eastern neighbourhood also caused population flows to Central Europe. People from 
the Eastern neighbourhood were better integrated than those coming from the South. However, due to the lack of 
longsighted immigration and integration policy to address Europe’s own demographic changes (with population 
declines in the countries least willing to integrate migrants) the full potential of these flows remains unfulfilled.
Key developments that led to this scenario:
•  In 2020, the EU decided to continue its commitment to the Western Balkans, though a solution to the conflicts in 
Eastern Europe was intangible. It supported Turkey’s policies in the Levant (Syria, fight against the Kurds) as long as 
they cooperated on refugee management. Instability in Libya continued to cause concern, but relations with Morocco 
improved.
•  The EU increased its spending on external relations with a focus on migration containment, supporting cooperation 
with third countries on migration management, and towards the neighbouring countries. Development cooperation 
continued to be a large part of EU external spending, but its objectives were increasingly politicised to reflect domestic 
preferences (mostly migration containment) and security priorities (anti-terrorism, border management). 
•  Europe continued to build up its profile in security matters, but its focus remained tied to anti-terrorism in Europe, 
North Africa and the Sahel, and other parts of the African continent. Its role in the broader Middle East remained 
secondary to other players, such as the US, Russia, Turkey, Iran, the Gulf States, and even China.
•  A few trade deals continued to be negotiated with trade-friendly countries which kept the international trade agenda 
ticking during the lull caused by a retrenchment in the US. Europe expanded its relations with Asian countries but 
remained a minor player as far as security in the Asian continent was concerned.
•  Other issues became part of the multilateral dialogue and saw a wide range of partners involved, including the US 
and China. These were tied to digital and technological developments and cyber security, where states cooperated 
especially when needing to address the rise of non-state actors in cyber space.
•  Environmental disasters occasionally caused unexpected forms of cooperation. Through the EU, Member States 
boosted their capabilities to respond to natural and human-made disasters.
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SCENARIO 2: INCLUSIVE GROWTH
By 2030, Europe manages to promote a notion of regional order which is projected beyond its borders and included 
the whole of Europe and parts of North Africa and the Middle East. The EU completed the accession process in 
the Balkans and developed a model of differentiated relations with other countries, some with the ambition to 
join the EU, others more focused on economic integration and intensification of political, cultural and human 
relations. Instability has not disappeared from Europe’s still fragile neighbourhood, and the consequences of conflict 
require immense efforts at reconstruction, but these also provided economic opportunities, which Europe and its 
neighbouring countries successfully seize. This helped diffuse demographic dynamics in North Africa and the Middle 
East, some of which continued to undergo transformation to become countries of immigration. 
Inclusive growth and demographic needs support policy changes in immigration policy, making EU Member States 
more positive towards improving legal channels for migration. Policy investments in education and training, coupled 
with support towards preventing brain drain in neighbouring countries help create a better match between supply 
and demand. Circular migration is supported, and technology becomes increasingly relevant to helping manage 
migration and labour markets.
Key developments that led to this scenario
•  By 2020, the EU managed to diffuse underlying tensions in the Balkans and pursue a truly transformative policy. A 
breakthrough with Russia enables a settlement of the conflict in Eastern Europe, where a more cooperative environment 
starts to emerge. 
•  Europe makes a political and economic investment into peace in the Middle East. 
•  By 2025, it became apparent that investing into sustainable development in Europe’s neighbourhood was a win-
win scenario with opportunities for further economic growth, facilitating smoother political relations and improved 
cooperative governance. Migration policies became part of this nexus.
•  EU Member States managed to broker a forward-looking Multi-Annual Financial Framework (MFF) for 2027 onwards 
which brought innovation to the ways in which the EU conducted its affairs, with a much stronger nexus being developed 
between internal and external policies. 
•  Stabilising the neighbourhood provided economic opportunities for European companies and led to investments into 
transnational infrastructure. Diversification of energy supplies and the growth of the green economy were made 
possible through public-private partnerships and investments. 
•  By 2030, the world moved towards large and integrated economic and political spaces cooperating with each other 
also on security matters.
SCENARIO 3: SLOW GROWTH AND FRAGMENTATION
By 2030, the European continent’s ability to manage its own challenges is hampered by its own fragmentation and 
slow growth. Eastern Europe and the Balkans displayed similar demographic patterns but Europe’s decline made 
the continent less attractive to immigration, thus causing important problems on the continent (ageing population, 
soaring social security costs, labour shortages). Russia too was affected by these patterns and lost weight in 
Eastern Europe and the Middle East. 
Conversely, Turkey, the Gulf states, Iran, Egypt all emerged as new powers emerged increasingly shaping North 
African and the Middle East interests. China became an external actor shaping Europe’s neighbourhood, with more 
of an interest in the Middle East and Central Asia than in Eastern Europe. Climate change increased environmental 
risks; European governments spent resources on addressing the consequences of major floods in Northern and 
Eastern Europe and desertification and fires around the Mediterranean basin.
The combination of the rise of Middle East powers and natural disasters caused by climate change made Europe 
vulnerable to influxes of migrants, both refugees and irregular – notably because of the presence of family and 
friends in European countries. Although Europe remained an attractive first stop, putting pressure on border 
management and reception infrastructure, overall the lack of economic prospects made most migrants move on 
to other emerging parts of the world.
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Democracy wanes globally, with authoritarianism rising and the quality of democracy deteriorating in the ‘old 
world’. Rising inequality and poverty puts great strain on all countries and creates uncertainty worldwide.
Key developments that led to this scenario
•  By 2020, economic recession in the Balkans led to inter-ethnic tensions which the EU did not manage to assuage. The 
level of political conflict brought the accession process to a standstill. 
•  Eastern Europe’s protracted conflicts remained unaddressed, prolonging a situation of stable instability, with Russia 
able to influence developments there. 
•  By 2025, sluggish growth put the whole of the European continent on hold. The EU moved towards declining irrelevance 
while other actors emerge. An authoritarian government in Russia began to tremble by 2025 and was eventually 
challenged by uprisings which, after a promising start for a degree of democratic change, degenerated into political 
infighting amongst clusters of financial and economic groups with uncertain consequences even in 2030. 
•  China consolidated its dominant position in Asia and globally. Trade continued haphazardly, mostly pushed by China, 
even if commercial-related disputes multiplied and some descended into security spats in the Asian seas and between 
the US and China. 
•  EU institutions moved towards irrelevance, plagued by the inability to address the consequences of climate change. 
With the European economy increasingly dependent on Chinese investments, migration patterns became shaped by 
China’s policies. Asia became a more popular destination leaving the EU behind in renewing its economy.
•  Some areas of cooperation emerged, such as on climate change, some security issues in Asia, and a limited web of 
bilateral trade agreements continued.
SCENARIO 4: SHOCKS, INEQUALITY AND CONTROL
Europe’s neighbourhood is deeply affected by the decline of international cooperation. The EU is unable to project 
any stability and growing international tensions run through the vulnerabilities of the Balkans, Eastern Europe, and 
North Africa. Other actors pursue interfering politics in neighbouring countries with the aim of destabilising the EU. 
Democracy disappears from the EU’s neighbourhood, which has become territory for new and old authoritarian 
powers each pursuing inflammable politics. 
By 2030 the EU is little more than a single market, with most countries pursuing national policies. The Schengen 
space is beyond repair; those Member States which managed to weather the crises (e.g. Germany) pursue bilateral 
policies on migration but the EU as a whole is less attractive for immigration. In fact, it heads towards becoming a 
continent of emigration following a period of brain drain of talented and best educated Europeans.
Key developments that led to this scenario
•  By 2020, the EU accession process came to a halt, also affecting Eastern Europe. By 2025, Russia imploded, Egypt 
went through a coup, and authoritarianism rose everywhere. 
•  Globally, commercial disputes turned into conflicts and brought international trade to a halt.
•  The uncontrolled development of digital technology without an international cooperative legal framework made 
governments and the private sector vulnerable to increased cyber-attacks on part of entities hardly known to the 
intelligence services. 
•  The weakening of state infrastructure supported uncontrolled movements of people, and contributed to the growth of 
illegal criminal activities around the movement of people.
•  Mercenary wars spread with no hope of international efforts brokering peace agreements between warring factions. 
•  Global inequality rose inexorably, welfare states crumbled, changing the face of the old democratic West. 
•  Pockets of wealthy elites led their economic affairs as private enterprises, with education, health, and societal security 
becoming privatised. 
•  The system attracted the migration of individuals, to work as service providers in such a privatised and atomised 
society, but did not contribute to overall economic development.
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4.3.4. 2030 in sub-Saharan Africa
BOX 12: 2030 SCENARIO IMPLICATIONS FOR SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA
By Edefe Ojomo, Lecturer, Department of Jurisprudence and International Law, Faculty of Law, University of Lagos
SCENARIO 1: CRISIS WITH COLLABORATION
In 2030, African countries have deepened their partnerships with one another and the rest of the world through 
regional and global multilateral arrangements, and they have been able to engage in global partnerships by 
presenting a united front in terms of harmonized policies and institutions in trade, security and social infrastructure. 
This has resulted from cooperation to address economic, political and social challenges in the region, including 
armed conflicts within some countries, public health challenges, and increased external economic reliance across 
the region. The African Union and some of the African Regional Economic Communities (RECs) have established 
efficient synergies across institutions and regions, forging partnerships in infrastructure development, launching 
successful political interventions in Member States, and fostering cooperation for the achievement of the 
Sustainable Development Goals. Morocco, Nigeria and South Africa have spearheaded the renegotiation of regional 
partnerships with the EU and China. This has facilitated greater macro-economic gains for African countries. China 
has also agreed to partner with the RECs to foster its relations with African countries in an effort to streamline 
economic development across the continent.
Despite increased collaboration, national income inequality is rampant across the region and has translated into 
regional economic divergence. This separates relatively rich countries like Botswana, Kenya, Morocco, Nigeria, and 
South Africa, from poor countries like Burkina Faso, Burundi, the Central African Republic, Guinea Bissau, and 
Liberia. While regional institutions seek to address this divergence, the infrastructure deficit on the continent limits 
the availability of technology to address economic and environmental challenges. Collaboration with China to 
improve infrastructure is on the increase but has also led to a xenophobic backlash against the influx of Chinese 
migrants who have settled on the continent. Droughts in the Sahel and the effects of deforestation in parts of 
Central and East Africa have contributed to some displacement of the population. Though countries like Uganda 
have made efforts to integrate refugees, new movements put a strain on already-challenged economies.
Migration trends and flows remain similar to the past three decades, with the prevalence of intra-regional migration. 
As labour migration increases and economic divergence deepens, diaspora communities work to fill gaps in the 
domestic socio-economic conditions of families and communities in origin countries. Remittance flows increase but 
continue to flow through mostly informal channels. Migrants are involved in the establishment and maintenance of 
small and medium-sized enterprises in origin countries.
Key developments that led to this scenario
•  By 2020, the African Union enhanced its peace and security architecture and worked closely with the RECs to promote 
democratic governance.
•  Environmental crises were tackled collectively at the regional level and with strong support from the World Bank and 
the African Development Bank and other partners.
•  Persistent socioeconomic differences amongst countries and sub-regions posed a threat to regional partnerships and 
demanded greater investments in social and political reforms.
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SCENARIO 2: INCLUSIVE GROWTH
In 2030, regional economic communities in Africa thrive. Regional trade is at record levels, and political cooperation 
has led to the development of regional infrastructure to serve cross-border engagements and communities. 
Economic development is also accompanied by political engagement at different levels of society, improving youth 
education and employment opportunities, as well as participation in the articulation of governance strategies. 
Developments in technology have also enhanced collaborations amongst businesses, public and private institutions, 
and individuals across the region. There has been clear progress towards achieving the Sustainable Development 
Goals, but despite significant economic growth and development and coordinated regional support, many countries 
fall short of meeting the goals.
Migration flows in the region increase significantly, as regional cooperation improves trade and economic 
opportunities for citizens. Although stronger global cooperation enhances global trade, global migration trends 
show a decrease in migration from Africa to countries outside the region, mostly because regional development 
has led to intraregional trade and economic vibrancy, leading to greater movements across the region. Countries 
like Nigeria and Cote D’Ivoire in West Africa, Kenya and Rwanda in East Africa and South Africa in Southern 
Africa remain hubs for migrants from within the respective sub-regions and across the region, but there are also 
significant business flows from those countries to other countries within and outside their sub-regions. Thus, there 
is a balance of movements between rich countries in the region and their less wealthy counterparts. While this has 
overall positive effects, there are xenophobic attacks in low-income countries with large migrant populations and 
political movements supporting these attacks claiming that “the foreigners are stealing local jobs and introducing 
crime”. Xenophobic attacks in rich countries like South Africa also targets migrants from Zimbabwe and Nigeria. 
Refugee flows are contained because of strong safeguards against political and environmental crises, based on 
regional and global cooperation. Intraregional migration consists mainly of voluntary sociocultural and economic 
movements, involving workers, students, and tourists. Regional institutions develop a framework for channelling 
diaspora engagement for coordinated national and regional growth, but there are reservations among local 
populations that inflows from the diaspora could disrupt social and economic opportunities for “locals”, so these 
tensions also give rise to political resistance. Remittance flows provide additional growth opportunities for countries 
with strong diaspora communities, but this is threatened by social and political movements attacking the political 
influence of citizens in the diaspora.
Key developments that led to this scenario
•  By 2020, the RECs were at the core of the African Union’s development agenda and this delivered progress in the 
areas of energy supply, public health, disease surveillance, trade facilitation and free movement of people, goods and 
capital. Poorer countries received significant support from larger economies such as Nigeria and South Africa. 
•  After Morocco re-joined the AU, Mauritania re-joined ECOWAS in the early 2020s, suggesting political and economic 
benefits to integration.
•  International engagement and cooperation resulted in a launch of a decisive offensive against terrorist groups in the 
region and provided security support to vulnerable communities in the affected countries. However, foreign support 
of groups like Al-Qaeda in the Maghreb and Boko Haram in Nigeria stifled economic and political growth in affected 
countries.  
•  By 2025, several successful elections led to democratic transitions in Cameroon, Madagascar, Sierra Leone, South 
Sudan and Zimbabwe.
•  The international community and a coalition of international NGOs partnered with local governments and supported 
African countries in meeting the Sustainable Development Goals, but even in spite of a last-minute push, security and 
political instability in some parts of the region derailed attempts to meet the goals.
•  By 2030, the EU had been successful in developing strong partnerships with Africa in the areas of trade, investments, 
peace and security, and migration. 
•  Movements into the EU from Africa were coordinated through regional and bilateral arrangements between receiving 
and sending countries.
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SCENARIO 3: SLOW GROWTH AND FRAGMENTATION
In 2030, countries are more inward-looking, as they seek economic growth and political development through 
nationalist frameworks in trade, investment, and resource development. Regional economic communities are unable 
to deliver on ambitious legal and policy goals because of the lack of political will among Member States. In West 
Africa, for instance, the ECOWAS community levy is being paid by half the Member States and regional resources 
are at an all-time low. Although some countries are experiencing economic growth, they are doing this amidst 
political strains, with increasing inequalities and limited political opportunities for young people. Technological and 
infrastructural developments provide some optimism, but these are hampered by fewer collaborative partnerships 
among nations, making infrastructure development more expensive in the absence of scale economies. Limited 
cooperation among states derails efforts to combat terrorism and incorporate climate change adaptation 
mechanisms on a regional scale. 
African sub-regions have strong social and cultural linkages that encourage regionalisation even in the absence of 
regional integration and sustain irregular intraregional migration flows. However, the absence of multilateralism 
and regionalism limits public regulation of increased transnational activities. Domestic growth in many states 
makes regional hubs more attractive as migrants seek greener pastures, but it also increases xenophobia and anti-
migrant sentiments. Diaspora networks demand more inclusive governance which can affect an increase in formal 
channels of remittances. However, informal channels continue to dominate, and diaspora communities encourage 
outward mobility amongst their networks in origin countries. 
Key developments that led to this scenario
•  By 2020, international engagement and cooperation to tackle terrorist threats suffered from lack of resources and the 
lack of political will thus increasing instability, insecurity and eventually growing internal displacement and refugee 
flows. 
•  Understaffed and underfunded, the African Union was unable to effectively respond to the political instability and 
armed conflict in some Member States, including in the Democratic Republic of Congo and the Central African Republic. 
•  RECs lost their influence. Francophone countries in West Africa looked to France for economic and political support, 
and, in the face of an increasingly isolationist UK government, Anglophone countries looked to the US, where the 2020 
elections saw a change in government and a more international-friendly government. Poor countries relied more on 
bilateral partnerships and donor countries like China preferred unilateral efforts to pursue their political goals in the 
region.
•  African countries were unable to negotiate a new partnership agreement with the EU after the expiration of the 
Cotonou agreement in 2020. 
•  By 2025, owing to increasingly onerous global trade conditions, intraregional trade grew significantly, as countries 
competed for participation in neighbouring markets. 
•  Private organizations engaged in smaller infrastructure and development projects to take advantage of the thriving 
regional economic conditions. 
•  Growing youth populations were involved in innovative technological projects and enterprises, and many of them 
sought better opportunities in education, industrial training, and employment in countries within and outside the region.
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SCENARIO 4: SHOCKS, INEQUALITY AND CONTROL
In 2030, global, regional and national inequalities in the political and economic spheres generate crises in countries 
across the region. Economic partners are unwilling to pursue collaboration and African countries have also lost 
the political will to integrate on many issues. Domestically, governments pursue their political goals by building 
strong client networks that undermine any efforts at seeking reforms. Poor infrastructure impedes technological 
development, and political activists, especially youth groups, clamour for change, while many pursue better 
economic and political conditions in other countries within and outside the region. 
Regular migration becomes more difficult as receiving countries – particularly those outside the region – place 
tighter restrictions on inflows. Irregular migration is on the rise. Citizens move through informal channels and border 
crossings and the informal economy expands, thus encouraging more irregular movements across the region and 
to other parts of the world. Migration to the EU increases. Economic and political crises, as well as environmental 
and natural disasters, lead to migrant and refugee flows within the region and occasionally escalate into irregular 
migration flows towards the EU. African countries seek partnerships with the EU (mostly bilateral in order to address 
national challenges), but the expansion of informal movements and economies render many such partnerships 
ineffective.
Regionalism is dead in Africa and, owing to the proliferation of megaregional arrangements across the world, 
multilateral institutions like the World Trade Organisation have become incompetent to establish and influence 
global standards. Countries are inward-looking and close-fisted, while citizens are outward-looking, seeking greater 
political freedoms, escaping persecution and inequalities, and pursuing economic subsistence in countries within 
and outside the region.
Key developments that led to this scenario
•  By 2020, African RECs experienced serious capacity deficits due to challenges with memberships and donor funding. 
•  Nigeria and South Africa had to deal with domestic political instability in the aftermath of controversial elections and 
limited their cooperation and coordination with the African Union and other regional entities. 
•  More economically successful countries experimented with new job programmes and basic income policies. This led to 
a higher influx of migrants from neighbouring countries and calls for restrictive immigration policies and a revision of 
the African Union’s free movement policy.
•  By 2025, several environmental crises, particularly in the Sahel region, had not received effective regional attention, 
thus facilitating the move against regionalism. The Sahel countries relied on bilateral partnerships with European 
partners, especially France, to address climate change and environmental challenges in the region.
•  Armed insurgencies and the rise of terrorist groups in Libya, Mali, and Nigeria, led to refugee flows and arms proliferation 
in the region, sparking more widespread conflict and xenophobia, with politicians taking advantage of such situations 
to divert attention from the poor economic performance in their countries.
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4.3.5. 2030 in Southeast Asia
BOX 13: 2030 SCENARIO IMPLICATIONS FOR SOUTHEAST ASIA
By Ronald Skeldon, Emeritus Professor in Geography, University of Sussex and Professor of Human Geography, 
Graduate School of Governance Maastricht University
SCENARIO 1: CRISIS WITH COLLABORATION
The economic crisis in China in 2020, which lead to confrontation in the South China Sea between China on the 
one hand and the Philippines, Malaysia and Vietnam on the other, created growing regional and global tensions. 
Increased regional and transnational cooperation and the movement to free market and free movement begin to 
take hold. There is a decline in labour force in various sectors across the region and automation is on the rise. We 
also see the emergence of primarily urban and multi-ethnic societies. 
The region increasingly looks within for the skilled migrants it needs, particularly to Singapore. Association of Southeast 
Asian Nations (ASEAN) reduces barriers to skilled migration, while forced migration of minorities within and outside 
the region is on the rise. There is also an emergence of pressures to import less-skilled labour from South Asia in 
particular. Internal migration is prevalent and is dominated by inter-urban movements and urban sprawl.
Key developments that led to this scenario:
•  By 2020, there was declining population growth with demographic decline in some countries and rural depopulation 
across the region.
•  Trade with China reduced and Southeast Asian nations looked to each other as preferred trade partners.
•  Democracy receded in the face of the rise or re-imposition of military rule. Rising nationalism took hold across the 
region and ethnic Chinese communities throughout Southeast Asia came under pressure.
•  By 2025, nationalism began to recede somewhat as education levels rise, demographic growth continued to lessen, 
and the economies improved. Automation was on the rise.
•  Regional and global economic growth resumed.
•  The United States re-engaged with ASEAN, which emerged as a significant political and economic force in the region, 
and there was a renewal of trade with China, initially through ethnic Chinese networks. 
•  By 2030, closer trade ties between both China and India and a strong movement towards an Asia-wide trading bloc 
began to emerge.
SCENARIO 2: INCLUSIVE GROWTH
By 2030, China is a dominant power in the region but protects its margins with prosperous nations. An EU type of 
integration emerges with the beginning of free trade and movements towards a common currency. 
As the region experiences sharp declines in rural-to-urban migration even as the largest cities continue to grow, there 
is a growing circulation of skilled migrants within the region and to overseas destinations. Severely depopulating 
rural areas emerge as a major policy concern. As a consequence of an ageing society and increased automation, 
migration at all skill levels within the region increases as the area of free movement expands. Skill interchanges 
with other regions are on the rise, though the search for unskilled labour continues, mainly in South Asia.
Key developments that led to this scenario:
•  By 2020, China deepened trade relations with other parts of the developed world, while China and India sought 
rapprochement and mutual border recognition.
•  ASEAN forged closer ties among the states of Southeast Asia politically and economically, and there was a trend 
towards more open democratic regimes in the region.
•  Population growth across the region continued to slow but cities continued to grow.
•  By 2025, China reached peak population and commenced a slow demographic decline.
•  Closer economic integration emerged across the region.
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SCENARIO 3: SLOW GROWTH AND FRAGMENTATION
By 2030, stagnation across Asia has given rise to internally oriented governments. Fragmentation at the global 
level also led to the disintegration of the United Nations and its agencies. As smaller and weaker states cease to 
be viable, they are absorbed in whole or in part into stronger neighbouring states. New empires start to emerge to 
combat the fragmentation but with weak penetrative power to bring effective control at the local levels. Capitalism 
as an effective global force is now dead and military governments dominate.
Rural-to-urban migration has slowed as economic growth in urban areas declined, with heavy return migration 
from cities in China to the rural sectors. Refugee flows from and to the region are on the rise. Those that are able, 
leave for destinations outside the region despite little progress on intra-regional recognition of skills. Expatriate 
populations leave the region in record numbers. As tension rise, movements of military personnel are meant to keep 
order and extend areas of national control. Whole villages and groups are directed to where labour is required or 
where security is ensured.
Key developments that led to this scenario:
•  By 2020, growing nationalism led to intra-regional rivalries, some states looked to China, others to India and others 
more broadly.
•  China faced internal dissent and turned to foreign adventurism to deflect domestic pressures.
•  Fertility decline stalled in certain parts of the region, mainly in rural and Muslim and Catholic groups.
•  By 2025, unemployment was on the rise and anti-Chinese riots took hold as dominant Buddhist and/or Muslim groups 
responded to austerity and inequalities.
•  China and India engaged in border hostilities.
SCENARIO 4: SHOCKS, INEQUALITY AND CONTROL
Governments across the region remain more authoritarian than democratic in order to direct an economic recovery. 
Inequalities are sharply on the rise. The region is plagued by shocks, primarily of a political nature, giving rise to 
disputes and even conflict, although these are dissipated within a five to ten-year period. 
After several years of low mobility, urban-ward migration is re-established. Diaspora organisations take on a 
greater role in both security and development. Eventually, this sets in motion the beginnings of an exchange of the 
skilled labour force across countries within the region, after years of stagnation. 
Key developments that led to this scenario:
•  By 2020, markets for regionally produced goods declined and unemployment rose, as well as the appeal of nationalist 
governments that expelled or practised forced assimilation of minority groups.
•  Expansionist China but also India brought political and military pressure on governments across the region.
•  By 2025, ASEAN economies were at a virtual standstill as regional and local trade declined.
•  Famine or at least severe food shortages in more marginal parts of the region took hold.
•  China and India were at virtual war, although stepped back from nuclear conflict, while the United Nations and other 
global agencies struggled to achieve some form of order.
•  Indian and Chinese Diasporas provided sanctuary for fearful citizens and those rich enough to flee. There was a mass 
return to rural areas as security in the cities deteriorated, and rising rates of stress migration, mainly within states and 
often rural-to-rural took hold.
•  By 2030, after a period of confrontation, economic growth began once again, and tensions dissipated between China 
and India with the resolution of border conflicts.
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5. CONCLUSIONS AND 
METHODOLOGICAL LESSONS
Based on the discussions and insights that informed 
this report, it seems important that some reflections 
on the future of EU migration policy should be started 
today in order to ensure that migration is a well-
managed EU policy area by 2030.
Across different scenarios, we see that the future of 
EU migration policymaking is moving towards more 
collaboration on migration control measures. However, 
one of the recurrent themes to come out of this report 
is that in the long-term, the EU may face a shortage 
of immigrants of all skill levels and should therefore 
think strategically beyond the current policy focus 
on stemming migration flows. There are a number 
of countries (such as China or Japan) with ageing 
populations and a shrinking workforce that will strive 
to become attractive immigration destinations in the 
near future. Therefore, new strategies to attract people 
with the skills in demand will need to be devised.
Migration policies can shape migration flows by 
selecting who can enter and reside in a country but 
have only limited impact on migration volumes and 
direction of flows. Other policy areas often have 
impacts beyond their intended scope, and inadvertently 
affect, whether positively or negatively, social-
economic conditions that are inextricably linked to 
the drivers of migration and displacement. Therefore, 
migration should be treated with a comprehensive 
and forward-looking approach that takes account of 
various social, technological, economic, environmental 
and political drivers. This requires reaching beyond 
migration policies and working towards systematic 
consideration of migration implications in a wide 
range of policy areas starting from trade, agriculture 
and fisheries, environment and finance. Foresight 
approaches can be helpful in these efforts because 
they provide methodologies and tools for a systematic 
consideration of relative certainties and uncertainties 
and their future relevance in a multi-stakeholder 
process.
Finally, what methodological lessons can be drawn 
from this project? There are different ways of 
approaching a foresight project that involves scenarios. 
In this case, rather than developing original foresight 
scenarios from scratch, we decided to adapt existing 
migration scenarios produced by other institutions 
that involved larger groups of experts and ran the 
project over longer periods of time. While there are 
obvious advantages to developing original scenarios 
(e.g. fit for purpose, sense of ownership in the group), 
our approach allowed us to speed up the process 
and focus our energy on developing and testing the 
practical application of the scenarios that resulted in 
the Migration discussion toolkit. In our experience, this 
was an essential and innovative part of the process 
that makes the scenarios and the foresight approach 
accessible to broader audiences who would otherwise 
not be impacted by such work. The resulting discussion 
tools are presented in the second part of this report.
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MIGRATION DISCUSSION TOOLKIT

1Migration has become a politically explosive and a 
highly divisive topic in the European Union (EU) and 
around the world. More than ever before, we need 
innovative discussion formats that enable a more 
balanced and less polarised debate about 
migration; where personal experiences and 
scientific evidence can come together and help to 
stimulate a forward-looking perspective, mutual 
understanding and collaboration between different 
stakeholders. This toolkit is a response to this need. 
It is the result of an interactive and participatory 
process led by the European Commission's Joint 
Research Centre (JRC), EU Policy Lab,* on the future 
of migration in the EU. The project engaged several 
stakeholders to explore and reﬂect upon the needs 
of EU policymaking and European responses around 
future migration challenges and opportunities.
Future scenarios oﬀer a means of stepping back 
from present day concerns and going beyond 
current mainstream thinking. By bridging research 
and policy, future scenarios can be used as tools for 
drawing policy implications from research ﬁndings 
and testing the long-term viability of policy 
proposals. 
However, scenarios on their own can only offer 
limited insights when it comes to actually informing 
policy processes or creating spaces for constructive 
dialogue with multiple stakeholders. This is why we 
developed a toolkit and guidelines on how to use 
scenarios in diﬀerent contexts and for diﬀerent 
purposes, based on user needs and adaptable to 
diﬀerent levels and facets of migration governance. 
This toolkit is the result of a years' worth of 
developing�, experimenting and testing a series of� 
scenario-based tools ready to be used by a variety 
of stakeholders in various contexts.
Seven tools were developed for this toolkit. We ﬁrst 
tested whether scenarios could oﬀer a meaningful 
platform for discussion on the future of migration in 
Europe in a series of focus groups (Tool 3). Here we 
asked experts, civil society, and policy-makers to 
discuss how diﬀerent future scenarios might challenge 
or impact the future of EU policymaking and EU 
governance structures. The focus groups, composed 
of no more than 15 experts, were a valuable and 
intimate platform in which the scenarios served as a 
backdrop for considering policy preparedness within 
the context of possible future developments. 
The scenarios were also used and adapted to a 
serious game, which serves as a simulation tool to 
engage in scenario exploration and future-oriented 
systemic thinking (Tool 5). Users experience the 
scenarios in diﬀerent roles such as a business 
representative, a civil society organisation, a public 
voice or a policymaker. The game was tested with 
policymakers and civil servants from diﬀerent parts of 
the world as well as with European policymakers, 
academics, and experts. The game allows users to 
quickly understand the logic of scenarios, the 
complexity of decision making, as well as the 
constraints and opportunities faced by diverse sets of 
stakeholders. We further adapted the serious game to 
a simpler approach that can be used with larger 
audiences (Tool 6), and in addition, we included a 
process that allows users to quickly develop their own 
scenarios for use with the serious game, or with any 
of the other tools included in this toolkit (Tool 7). 
INTRODUCTION
Tool development: testing and experimentation
* The project was coordinated by Alice Szczepanikova and Tine Van Criekinge.
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With the aim of developing processes to suit a 
variety of needs, we also developed tools that would 
require less time than the focus groups and the 
serious game, and be better suited to users such as 
local authorities, civil society, or business and 
enterprise, as well as policy-makers at the EU level. 
The Migrant journeys tool (Tool 1) takes aspects of 
the scenarios to more closely investigate how 
migrant decisions and journeys might be aﬀected 
under various conditions and the extent to which 
policies actually impact such decisions. Similarly, The 
future of integration in European cities tool (Tool 2) 
looks more closely at the national and local levels, 
and how various stakeholders can collaborate under 
certain conditions deriving from the scenarios. Both 
these tools were tested with students, experts, local 
authorities, and civil society, and on each occasion, 
based on detailed feedback, adapted and adjusted to 
better ﬁt user needs. Lastly, the co-designing policies 
tool (Tool 4) was developed in collaboration with our 
expert group, as a means to discuss the opportunities 
and constraints that future scenarios provide in 
negotiating common objectives and policies, with the 
view that a wide set of public policies should be 
considered when shaping and planning for desired 
migration outcomes. 
How to use this toolkit
The toolkit was initially envisioned for use in EU 
policymaking circles, where the tools on co-designing 
policies, the scenario exploration, and focus groups 
can oﬀer fruitful and innovative ways for discussing, 
planning and testing policy developments in an 
inclusive and ﬂexible setting. The tools can also be 
used by other stakeholders, including those based 
outside the EU, such as civil society, private 
enterprises, think-tanks and academia. Some of the 
tools have already been used also in educational 
setting for university students. 
In each tool description, users will ﬁnd who is the ideal 
target audience and what outcomes can be expected 
by using the tool, the requirements in terms of 
facilitation, duration, and materials (including a set of 
accompanying toolkit elements* speciﬁc to each tool), 
and step-by-step instructions on how to use the tool, 
including possible alternatives and options to better 
tailor to speciﬁc user needs. The tool instructions 
should be interpreted as guidelines on how best to use 
the tools – users should feel free to tailor and adjust 
according to the topic they are looking to explore, the 
participants needs and expectations, the timeframe of 
interest, and the timing and setting available to them. 
The facilitation of discussions that use the tools does 
not require any specific skills beyond the ability to 
clearly explain the rules, create a pleasant and 
welcoming atmosphere for the discussion and 
effective time management. It is essential that in 
preparation for the use of the tools, users have a clear 
idea of what they want to achieve with the exercise. 
This needs to be communicated to the participants in 
order to stimulate their motivation to actively 
contribute to the process.
*http://publications.jrc.ec.europa.eu/repository/bitstream/JRC111538/kjnb29060enn.pdf
The tools presented here, are an initial set – from 
which other forms of engagement are likely to stem, 
and which will continue to be developed as their use 
becomes more widespread. We encourage users to 
provide us with their feedback and experiences in 
using the diﬀerent tools, and we hope that together, 
we can refine and spread these new ways of 
discussing migration issues. 
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Scenario Exploration System: The future 
of migration in the EU and beyond
TOOL 6.  39-43
Scenario exploration suitable for larger
audiences
This is an adaptation of the Scenario Exploration 
System (Tool 5) which ﬁts larger audiences. This tool 
allows for scenario exploration by bigger groups by 
following the broad logic of the Scenario Exploration 
System, without the need for prior training of game-
masters nor preparation of game material.
TOOL 7. 44-49
Building new scenarios or adapting existing
ones for use with the Scenario Exploration System
This tool provides an expedient way of developing 
scenarios when faced with time constraints. In using 
this tool, the four migration scenarios that are used 
in this toolkit can be easily adapted to better ﬁt the 
theme and topics that users would like to explore 
further. In addition, users can also create entirely new 
scenarios based on diﬀerent axes, narratives and time 
frames. The outcome of this exercise can be used in 
the Scenario Exploration System (Tool 5). 
MIGRATION DISCUSSION TOOLKIT 
Overview
TOOL 1.       7-11
Migrant journeys and the role of policies 
This tool helps participants learn about key aspects in  
migration decision-making by taking the role of a 
potential migrant whose life unfolds over one or two 
distinct future scenarios. This tool is suited for people 
interested in the interplay of intended and unintended 
TOOL 2.     12-16 
The future of integration in European cities
and its multilevel governance
This tool invites users to explore the challenges and  
opportunities in shaping future immigrant integration 
processes in European cities by putting themselves in  
the shoes of national or local policymakers, as private
sector and a civil society representative. The users will
discuss what strategies and forms of collaboration
could be developed to better harness immigrant 
potential and to avoid the formation of segregated 
and divided societies. 
TOOL 3.   17-21
Thematic focus groups exploring diﬀerent
aspects of migration policies and implications
This tool allows users to explore the future of migration 
and migration-related policies under four diﬀerent future 
scenarios. It can be used to test the preparedness of 
policies for future developments, and alternative 
pathways towards reaching preferred policy outcomes. It 
can be used both by those involved in the policymaking 
process, particularly in the agenda-setting phase, as well 
as by various stakeholders in civil society and the private 
sector. 
TOOL 4.  22-26 
Co-designing policies
This tool allows users to explore the perceptions and 
interests of diﬀerent actors in developing migration 
policies and public policies that are linked to migration 
outcomes. It can be used to prepare for negotiations or 
stakeholder consultations with partner countries, or 
when formulating policies within organisations at 
different levels of governance. 
consequences of migration policies and their inter-
section with decision-making processes by migrants 
and other stakeholders. 
This tool is a migration version of the JRC’s Scenario
 Exploration System - a serious game used to explore
various future scenarios and the opportunities and  
constraints faced by diﬀerent groups of stakeholders. 
With this tool you experience what it feels like to have  
your say in migration policymaking as an EU or national 
policymaker, civil society or business representative
and the voice of the public. 
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Scenario Exploration System: The future 
of migration in the EU and beyond
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Scenario exploration suitable for larger
audiences
This is an adaptation of the Scenario Exploration 
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allows for scenario exploration by bigger groups by 
following the broad logic of the Scenario Exploration 
System, without the need for prior training of game-
masters nor preparation of game material.
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TOOLKIT ELEMENTS 
Migrant Persona narrative templates
To be able to use the tools you need accompanying 
elements. The ones you need are listed in the 
instructions of the tools. This is an overview of all 
the elements, which you can request by contacting 
alice.szczepanikova@ec.europa.eu.
Integration Stakeholder narrative templates
Scenario detail cards
Toolkit elements
MIGRATION DISCUSSION TOOLKIT
6
Scenario poster Certainty and uncertainty cards
There is one set of certainty and uncertainty cards that 
apply to the EU, and another set for non-EU: Africa, Asia 
and Eastern European Neighbourhood. 
TOOLKIT ELEMENTS 
Governance cards
6Scenario poster Certainty and uncertainty cards
There is one set of certainty and uncertainty cards that 
apply to the EU, and another set for non-EU: Africa, Asia 
and Eastern European Neighbourhood. 
TOOLKIT ELEMENTS 
Governance cards
DESCRIPTION
This tool helps participants learn about key aspects in migration
decision-making by taking the role of a potential migrant whose
life unfolds over one or two distinct future scenarios. The tool is
suited for people interested in the interplay of intended and 
unintended consequences of migration policies and their inter-
section with decision-making processes by migrants and other 
stakeholders.  
REQUIREMENTS
Facilitation
1-2 facilitators 
2.5 hours to explore two scenarios, 1.5 hours to explore one
scenario only 
aterial
- Migrant Persona narrative templates  
- Scenario detail cards for one or two opposing scenarios 
- Markers (optional) 
- Flipcharts (optional)
2.5
hours
3-12
participants
1-2
facilitators
PERSONA
A4
7
Tool 1. Migrant journeys and the role of policies
MIGRATION DISCUSSION TOOLKIT
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Introduce yourself and brieﬂy describe the tool and the 
process.
Brieﬂy introduce yourselves and explain your motivation for 
taking part in this exercise.
Make participants aware of both expected and unexpected 
eﬀects of migration policies.
Stimulate discussion about expected and unexpected eﬀects 
of migration policies. 
POSSIBLE KICK-OFF QUESTIONS
Based on your knowledge and/or experience how have 
migration policies such as introduction of visa, tightening of 
border controls or establishing of an area of freedom of 
movement inﬂuenced actual migration ﬂows and patterns? 
Insights from the JRC report European Migrations: Dynamics, 
Drivers, and the Role of Policies* with historical examples of 
these eﬀects can be used as a starting point for the discussion. 
10
minutes
20
minutes
*de Haas, 2018. Available at: https://publications.europa.eu/en/publication-detail/-/publication/0e56c014-3232-11e8-b5fe-01aa75ed71a1
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GOAL
Make participants aware about key aspects in migration 
decision-making by taking the role of a potential migrant whose 
life unfolds over two contrasting future scenarios.
INSTRUCTION FOR FACILITATOR(S)
1. Introduce migrant proﬁles by using Migrant Persona
narrative templates.
2. Ask participants to form up to 4 groups of up to 3
participants around each persona.
INSTRUCTION FOR PARTICIPANTS
1. Decide which persona you want to work on and form a
small group.
2. Develop brief narratives of individual/family
decision-making, including possible migration decisions,
on the basis of the two selected scenarios.
INSTRUCTION FOR FACILITATOR(S)
1. Provide details about the ﬁrst scenarios per 5-year time
frame (2020, 2025, 2030) every 10 minutes using
scenario detail cards.
INSTRUCTION FOR PARTICIPANTS
1. Consider the characteristics of your person/family and
identify possible decisions made, including the decision
to migrate or to stay.
2. In case of migration, identify when, how and where to
migration would occur.
3. Consider how migration policies aﬀected migrants'
decisions and what other factors were important,
including the potential role of other policies.
4. Prepare a brief summary of your discussion framed
around a few key questions listed on the narrative
template.
STEP 3.0 
MIGRATION DECISION-MAKING: POTENTIAL 
MIGRANT’S PERSPECTIVE
STEP 3.1
(MIGRATION) DECISIONS BASED ON 
FIRST SCENARIO
40
minutes
PERSONA
PERSONA
Tool 1. Migrant journeys and the role of policies
MIGRATION DISCUSSION TOOLKIT
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INSTRUCTION FOR PARTICIPANTS
1. Select a rapporteur in your group and provide a 3-minute
summary of your individual/family’s decisions in each
scenario.
2. Focus on the factors that were important in making
(migration or non-migration) decisions and the
role of migration and non-migration policies in this
process.
INSTRUCTION FOR FACILITATOR(S)
1. Provide details about the second scenarios per 5-year
time frame (2020, 2025, 2030) every 10 minutes
using scenario detail cards.
INSTRUCTION FOR PARTICIPANTS
1. Using the same profile and following the structure as
in Step 3.1, consider the decisions made by the
individual/family as the second scenario unfolds.
2. Prepare a brief summary of your discussion framed
around a few key questions listed on the narrative
template.
ATTENTION
INSTRUCTION FOR FACILITATOR(S)
If you want to avoid the 10 min. interruptions, you can 
also provide the full scenario detail at the beginning of 
Step 3.1 and Step 3.2. The trade-o° being that this 
makes the simulation exercise less realistic because in 
real life, we do not know what is going to happen that far 
in the future.
STEP 3.3
GROUP REPORTING
STEP 3.2
(MIGRATION) DECISIONS BASED ON 
SECOND SCENARIO
15
minutes
35
minutes
PERSONA
10
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1. Select a rapporteur in your group and provide a 3-minute
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role of migration and non-migration policies in this
process.
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1. Provide details about the second scenarios per 5-year
time frame (2020, 2025, 2030) every 10 minutes
using scenario detail cards.
INSTRUCTION FOR PARTICIPANTS
1. Using the same profile and following the structure as
in Step 3.1, consider the decisions made by the
individual/family as the second scenario unfolds.
2. Prepare a brief summary of your discussion framed
around a few key questions listed on the narrative
template.
ATTENTION
INSTRUCTION FOR FACILITATOR(S)
If you want to avoid the 10 min. interruptions, you can 
also provide the full scenario detail at the beginning of 
Step 3.1 and Step 3.2. The trade-o° being that this 
makes the simulation exercise less realistic because in 
real life, we do not know what is going to happen that far 
in the future.
STEP 3.3
GROUP REPORTING
STEP 3.2
(MIGRATION) DECISIONS BASED ON 
SECOND SCENARIO
15
minutes
35
minutes
PERSONA
11
GOAL
Share and capture policy implications emerging from the 
parallel discussions.
INSTRUCTION FOR PARTICIPANTS
1. Select a rapporteur in your group and provide a 3-minute
pitch of the lessons learned from the exercise and the
policy implications that can be derived from these
lessons.
2. Anybody can oﬀer insights from the overall exercise.
INSTRUCTION FOR FACILITATOR(S)
1. If the results are to be recorded and/or shared with those
who did not participate in the exercise, capture the main
points on post-its.
2. Moderate the discussion in a way that insights from
diﬀerent migrants' journeys in the two scenarios can be
compared and more general conclusions can be drawn.
POSSIBLE DISCUSSION QUESTIONS
What was the main diﬀerence in the decision-making 
process in the two scenarios? What does it tell us about 
possible impact of future trends and developments?
What did you learn about the expected and unexpected 
eﬀects of migration policies in this exercise? Can you think 
of an example of how you could apply what you have 
learned today in your ﬁeld of work?  
3. Close the session.
STEP 4 
POLICY IMPLICATIONS
30
minutes
?
PERSONA
Tool 1. Migrant journeys and the role of policies
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DESCRIPTION
This tool invites users to explore the challenges and opportunities
in shaping future immigrant integration processes in European
cities by putting themselves in the shoes of national or local
policymakers, a private sector and a civil society representative.
The users will discuss what strategies and forms of collaboration
could be developed to better harness immigrant potential and to
avoid the formation of segregated and divided societies.   
REQUIREMENTS
Facilitation
1-2 facilitators 
Duration
2.5 hours to explore two scenarios, 1.5 hours to explore one
scenario only 
Toolkit elements and materials
- Integration Persona narrative templates  
- Scenario detail cards for one or two opposing scenarios 
- Markers (optional) 
- Flipcharts (optional)
TOOL 2. THE FUTURE OF 
INTEGRATION IN EUROPEAN
CITIES
2.5
hours
3-12
participants
1-2
facilitators
A4
Introduce yourself and brieﬂy describe the tool and the 
process.
Brieﬂy introduce yourselves and explain your motivation for 
taking part in this exercise.
Discuss trends and myths with regard to integration policies, 
their level of success and the changing role of actors at 
Stimulate discussion about the topic.  
POSSIBLE KICK-OFF QUESTIONS
How do we measure impact of integration initiatives? 
What could be done diﬀerently?  
10
minutes
20
minutes
diﬀerent levels of governance. 
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DESCRIPTION
This tool invites users to explore the challenges and opportunities
in shaping future immigrant integration processes in European
cities by putting themselves in the shoes of national or local
policymakers, a private sector and a civil society representative.
The users will discuss what strategies and forms of collaboration
could be developed to better harness immigrant potential and to
avoid the formation of segregated and divided societies.   
REQUIREMENTS
Facilitation
1-2 facilitators 
Duration
2.5 hours to explore two scenarios, 1.5 hours to explore one
scenario only 
Toolkit elements and materials
- Integration Persona narrative templates  
- Scenario detail cards for one or two opposing scenarios 
- Markers (optional) 
- Flipcharts (optional)
TOOL 2. THE FUTURE OF 
INTEGRATION IN EUROPEAN
CITIES
2.5
hours
3-12
participants
1-2
facilitators
A4
Tool 2. The future of integration in european cities
MIGRATION DISCUSSION TOOLKIT
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GOAL
Make participants aware of key aspects in integration  
policymaking by positioning themselves as key integration 
stakeholders in two contrasting future scenarios.
INSTRUCTION FOR FACILITATOR(S)
1. Introduce
narrative templates.
2. Ask participants to form up to  groups of up to 3
participants around each
INSTRUCTION FOR PARTICIPANTS
1. Decide which u want to work on  
small group.
2. Develop brief narratives of
selected scenarios.
INSTRUCTION FOR FACILITATOR(S)
1. 
INSTRUCTION FOR PARTICIPANTS
1. 
2. 
3.
4. 
a
STEP 3.0 
INTEGRATION POLICY IN TWO DIFFERENT 
FUTURE SCENARIOS
STEP 3.1
DEFINE CHARACTERISTICS OF YOUR
INTEGRATION STAKEHOLDER minutes
Clarify your short-term and mid-term priorities with regards
to immigrant integration.
14
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Make participants aware of key aspects in integration  
policymaking by positioning themselves as key integration 
stakeholders in two contrasting future scenarios.
INSTRUCTION FOR FACILITATOR(S)
1. Introduce
narrative templates.
2. Ask participants to form up to  groups of up to 3
participants around each
INSTRUCTION FOR PARTICIPANTS
1. Decide which u want to work on  
small group.
2. Develop brief narratives of
selected scenarios.
INSTRUCTION FOR FACILITATOR(S)
1. 
INSTRUCTION FOR PARTICIPANTS
1. 
2. 
3.
4. 
a
STEP 3.0 
INTEGRATION POLICY IN TWO DIFFERENT 
FUTURE SCENARIOS
STEP 3.1
DEFINE CHARACTERISTICS OF YOUR
INTEGRATION STAKEHOLDER minutes
Clarify your short-term and mid-term priorities with regards
to immigrant integration.
INSTRUCTION FOR PARTICIPANTS
INSTRUCTION FOR PARTICIPANTS
to manoeuvre and your actions.
INSTRUCTION FOR FACILITATOR(S)
Provide details about the second scenario by using the 
Scenario detail cards of how the world 
could evolve in the next X years”).
STEP 3.2
INTEGRATION DECISIONS AND ACTIONS
BASED ON FIRST SCENARIO 
STEP 3.3
INTEGRATION DECISIONS AND ACTIONS
BASED ON SECOND SCENARIO 
30
minutes
30
minutes
INSTRUCTION FOR FACILITATOR(S)
 by using the 
Scenario detail cards 
. 
Prepare a brief summary of your discussion structured by 
questions provided on the template. 
15
Tool 2. The future of integration in european cities
MIGRATION DISCUSSION TOOLKIT
INSTRUCTION FOR FACILITATOR(S)
2. Each group summarises the lessons learned from the
exercise and the policy implications that can be derived from
these lessons.
Capture the results on a few post-its with legible hand-   
writing and place them on a poster/ﬂipchart sharing with 
the rest of participants if relevant. These should ideally 
INSTRUCTION FOR PARTICIPANTS
Select a rapporteur in your group and provide a 3-minute  
summary of your actions and constraints in each schenario. 
GOAL
Share and capture policy implications emerging from  
the parallel discussions.
INSTRUCTION FOR PARTICIPANTS
1. One group at a time provides a 5-minute summary of their
integration stakeholder’s decisions, actions and challenges
in each scenario, addressing in particular the role of
STEP 3.4
GROUP REPORTING
STEP 4
INSIGHTS AND WRAP-UP
15
minutes
30
minutes
migration and non-migration policies in their decision-making
process.
be written in a format of short statements that will  
communicate the main outcomes of the discussions.  
Close the session.
POSSIBLE DISCUSSION QUESTION
Can you think of an example of how you could apply what 
you have learned today in your ﬁeld of work?  
16
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the rest of participants if relevant. These should ideally 
INSTRUCTION FOR PARTICIPANTS
Select a rapporteur in your group and provide a 3-minute  
summary of your actions and constraints in each schenario. 
GOAL
Share and capture policy implications emerging from  
the parallel discussions.
INSTRUCTION FOR PARTICIPANTS
1. One group at a time provides a 5-minute summary of their
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DESCRIPTION
This tool allows users to explore the future of migration and 
migration-related policies under four diﬀerent future scenarios. 
It can be used to test the preparedness of policies for future 
developments, and alternative pathways towards reaching 
preferred policy outcomes. It can be used both by those involved 
in the policymaking process, particularly in the agenda-setting 
phase, as well as by various stakeholders in civil society and 
the private sector.  
REQUIREMENTS
Facilitation
1-2 facilitators 
Duration
2 - 3.5 hours
aterial
- Scenario detail cards for two opposing or four scenarios 
- Empty scenario poster (optional) 
- Governance cards (optional)
- Certainy and uncertainty cards (optional)
TOOL 3. THEMATIC FOCUS 
GROUPS EXPLORING 
MIGRATION POLICIES AND IMPLICATIONS
2-3.5
  hours
6-10 1-2
facilitatorsparticipants
Tool 3. Thematic focus groups exploring migration policies and implications
MIGRATION DISCUSSION TOOLKIT
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Introduce yourself and brieﬂy describe the tool and the 
process.
Brieﬂy introduce yourselves and explain your motivation for 
taking part in this exercise.
To come to a common understanding of the current
state-of-play of the policy area under discussion and to
discuss possible future developments and challenges. 
Give a basic overview of the state-of-play of the policy area 
under discussion (i.e. labour-market policies, foreign policy 
and external action, integration policies, migration policies) 
(see for example section 3.2 in the accompanying report). 
SETTING THE SCENE 
10
minutes
20
minutes
 
1. Discuss the major developments in the policy area under
    discussion and its implication on migration outcomes
    and processes.
2. Discuss possible policy developments in the future and
    whether the policy is ﬁt-for-purpose given current and 
   future challenges and opportunities.   
  
    PARTICIPANTS 
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GOAL
To discuss policy developments in a certain policy area in the
 context of a migration scenario; to discuss how policy 
developments in a scenario could impact migration outcomes; 
to discuss whether policies are ﬁt for purpose/preparedness.
 
INSTRUCTION FOR FACILITATOR(S)
1. Using the Scenario detail cards for one scenario, explain
the developments in that scenario.
2. Explain the implications on migration for that scenario.
INSTRUCTION FOR PARTICIPANTS
1. Participants discuss the following questions:
a. What are the likely developments in the policy area and
initiatives in this scenario?
b. What are the likely impacts of these policy developments
on migration and integration outcomes in Europe in this
scenario?
c. What space for policy reform and innovation would there
be under the constraints and opportunities in governance
under this scenario?
2. Participants may wish to have an empty scenario poster
(with axes only) to be used for note-taking.
STEP 3.0 
POLICY DEVELOPMENTS UNDER DIFFERENT
FUTURE SCENARIOS
20
minutes
?
  
 
SUGGESTIONS
1. For foreign and external policies, consider the following:
    diﬀerent policy and funding instruments (i.e. non-migration
    policy tools such as trade, development aid, conditionality,
    third-country agreements) for migration management,
    future of the migration-development-security nexus, the
    role of conﬂict and crisis management/fragility.
2. For labour market policies consider the following: labour
market liberalisation and segmentation, impacts of
automation and digitalisation on labour demand, implications
of ageing population and shrinking workforce, the role of
trade unions.
3. For integration policies consider the following: space for
innovation, role of technology, educational policies,
interrelationship between migration and integration
policies.
?
Tool 3. Thematic focus groups exploring migration policies and implications
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GOAL
To discuss policy developments in a certain policy area in 
the context of an opposing migration scenario; to discuss  
how policy developments in the opposing scenario could 
impact migration outcomes; to discuss whether policies are 
ﬁt for purpose/preparedness. 
STEP 3.1 
POLICY DEVELOPMENTS UNDER  
AN ALTERNATIVE SCENARIO
20
minutes
INSTRUCTION FOR FACILITATOR(S)
1. Using the cenario detail cards for an opposing scenario
 from the one previously discussed  (i.e scenario 1 and 3, 
    or scenario 2 and 4), explain the developments in that
    scenario.
2. Explain the implications on migration for that scenario.
3. Compare the results of the two scenarios once participants
have completed the steps below.
.
INSTRUCTION FOR PARTICIPANTS
1. Participants discuss the following questions:
a. What are the likely developments in the policy area and
initiatives in this scenario?
b. What are the likely impacts of these policy developments
on migration and integration outcomes in Europe in this
scenario?
c. What space for policy reform and innovation would there
be under the constraints and opportunities in governance
under this scenario?
2. Participants may wish to have an empty scenario poster
(with axes only) to be used for note-taking.
3. Compare the results of the discussion across the two
opposing scenarios.
 
 
ALTERNATIVE
Steps 3.0 and 3.1 may be repeated with two further 
opposing scenarios for a four-scenario overview of diﬀerent 
future developments. 
    
?
ALTERNATIVE
An additional or alternative discussion can take place using
the certainty and uncertainty cards. Facilitators can guide
the discussion by asking participants to consider how
certainties and uncertainties in the social, technological, 
environmental, economic and political spheres might develop
considering the developments in the diﬀerent scenarios. 
    
    
   
    
    
?
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ﬁt for purpose/preparedness. 
STEP 3.1 
POLICY DEVELOPMENTS UNDER  
AN ALTERNATIVE SCENARIO
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minutes
INSTRUCTION FOR FACILITATOR(S)
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    or scenario 2 and 4), explain the developments in that
    scenario.
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3. Compare the results of the two scenarios once participants
have completed the steps below.
.
INSTRUCTION FOR PARTICIPANTS
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scenario?
c. What space for policy reform and innovation would there
be under the constraints and opportunities in governance
under this scenario?
2. Participants may wish to have an empty scenario poster
(with axes only) to be used for note-taking.
3. Compare the results of the discussion across the two
opposing scenarios.
 
 
ALTERNATIVE
Steps 3.0 and 3.1 may be repeated with two further 
opposing scenarios for a four-scenario overview of diﬀerent 
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?
ALTERNATIVE
An additional or alternative discussion can take place using
the certainty and uncertainty cards. Facilitators can guide
the discussion by asking participants to consider how
certainties and uncertainties in the social, technological, 
environmental, economic and political spheres might develop
considering the developments in the diﬀerent scenarios. 
    
    
   
    
    
?
20
INSTRUCTION FOR FACILITATOR(S)
1. If the results are to be recorded and/or shared with those
   who did not participate in the exercise, capture the main points
   on post-its. 
policies can be compared and more general conclusions can
be drawn.
3. Close the session.
INSTRUCTION FOR FACILITATOR(S)
1. Present the participants with the set of governance cards.
2. Ask participants to discuss the opportunities and constraints
GOAL
Share and capture the implications emerging from the 
discussions.  
INSTRUCTION FOR PARTICIPANTS
1. Select a rapporteur in your group and provide a 3-minute
    pitch of the lessons learned from the exercise and the policy 
    implications that can be derived from these lessons.
from
STEP 4
CONSTRAINTS AND OPPORTUNITIES
FOR MULTI-LEVEL GOVERNANCE 
(Optional)
STEP 5
WRAP-UP
30
minutes
20
minutes
GOAL
levels of governance under various constraints and
INSTRUCTION FOR PARTICIPANTS
1. Using the governance cards, discuss the constraints and
    opportunities for each level of governance under each of
    the two scenarios.
    objectives. 
POSSIBLE DISCUSSION QUESTION
Can you think of an example of how you could apply what 
you have learned today in your ﬁeld of work?  
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Tool 3. Thematic focus groups exploring migration policies and implications
MIGRATION DISCUSSION TOOLKIT
DESCRIPTION
This tool allows users to explore the perceptions and interests of
diﬀerent actors in developing migration policies and public
policies that are linked to migration outcomes. It can be used to
prepare for negotiations or stakeholder consultations with partner
countries, or when formulating policies within an organisation or 
at diﬀerent levels of governance.
REQUIREMENTS
Facilitation
1-2 facilitators 
2 hours and 10 minutes
aterial
- Governance cards  
- Certainty and uncertainty cards (available for EU and non-EU) 
- Scenario detail cards for two opposing scenarios (optional) 
- Scenario poster (optional)
CO-DESIGNING 
POLICIES hours4 0participants facilitators
A3
cca 2
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Introduce yourself and brieﬂy describe the tool and the 
process.
Brieﬂy introduce yourselves and explain your motivation for 
taking part in this exercise.
To deﬁne the role of each participant and to understand the 
diﬀering positions, objectives, and goals of each stakeholder
Explain that participants are to deﬁne their role. 
ROLE DEFINITION 
10
minutes
15
minutes
1. Choose a category of stakeholder from the set
of    governance cards.
2. On the back of the card, each participant writes down:
a. their role in the organisation
b. the policy area they are working in
c. from their perspective, what the policy objective(s) for
migration and broader public policies should be
(max 2-3 bullet points per person)
3. Cards are then placed in the middle of the table, wall or
poster paper.
    PARTICIPANTS 
ATTENTION
Governance cards can be used twice (more than one 
participant can choose the same category of stakeholder) and 
not each card needs to be represented. 
Tool 4. Co-designing policies
MIGRATION DISCUSSION TOOLKIT
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GOAL
To identify the shared interests amongst the group, and where
possible collaboration and/or negotitation is required to come 
INSTRUCTION FOR PARTICIPANTS
1. Each participant reads out the objectives to the rest of the
group.
2. As a group, discuss the overlaps and disconnects within
INSTRUCTION FOR FACILITATOR(S)
Capture the 3-5 priorities on a separate sheet of paper, 
ﬂip chart or board.
STEP 3 
SHARING PERCEIVED INTERESTS
30
minutes
?
to a common objective.  
3. Identify (at least) 3-5 common agreed-upon priority
and amongst the objectives.
objectives for migration and related public policies
between the stakeholders.
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GOAL
To collaborate on designing policies that reach speciﬁed 
objectives, and where public policies are linked to reaching 
certain migration objectives. 
INSTRUCTION FOR PARTICIPANTS
1. Choose one priority area and ﬁnd a partner (preferably
and opposing stakeholder with potentially conﬂicting views)
to work with you.
2. Partners discuss the following:
ALTERNATIVE
If you have more time available, consider running STEP 4 using 
two diﬀerent future scenarios as a framework for collaboration 
and negotiation. Use the scenario poster and the Scenario detail 
cards and focus on two opposing scenarios to frame a 
discussion. First, run the exercise under one scenario, and then 
again using an opposing scenario. Discuss the opportunities and 
constraints each scenario provides in negotiating common 
objectives and policies. 
STEP 4.0 
CO-DESIGNING POLICIES
45
minutes
?
a. What migration policies are needed to reach this obejctive?
b. What other public policies are needed to reach this objective?
c. How can these policies become more consistent with the
aspirations and behaviours of migrants?
d. Who are the stakeholders that you will need to work with in
order to implement this policy?
  
3. Present the policies developed to the rest of the group.
4. Discuss whether collaboration is necessary in order to reach
the policy objectives.
Tool 4. Co-designing policies
MIGRATION DISCUSSION TOOLKIT
INSTRUCTION FOR FACILITATOR(S)
1. If the results are to be recorded and/or shared with those
who did not participate in the exercise, capture the main points
 on post-its. 
policies can be compared and more general conclusions can 
be drawn. 
3. Close the session.
INSTRUCTION FOR PARTICIPANTS
1. Each member of the group picks one certainty and one
    uncertainty card at random.
2. Discuss whether the policy developed takes account of the
    certainties and uncertainties that have been picked.
3. Discuss whether the policy will need to be adapted in order
    for it to be viable in the long-term.
GOAL
Share and capture policy implications emerging from  
the parallel discussion.
INSTRUCTION FOR PARTICIPANTS
1. Select a rapporteur in your group and provide a 3-minute
pitch of the lessons learned from the exercise and the policy 
implications that can be derived from these lessons.
STEP 4.1
LONG TERM VIABILITY
STEP 5
POLICY IMPLICATIONS
15
minutes
minutes
?
GOAL
Test the long-term viability of the policies developed in   
STEP 4 using the certainty and uncertainty cards.
ALTERNATIVE
Cards can be prepared beforehand if you wish to test some
particular elements, or if you want to focus on a particular 
theme i.e. social, technological, environmental, economic,
or political .
POSSIBLE DISCUSSION QUESTION
Can you think of an example of how you could apply what 
you have learned today in your ﬁeld of work?  
26
INSTRUCTION FOR FACILITATOR(S)
1. If the results are to be recorded and/or shared with those
who did not participate in the exercise, capture the main points
 on post-its. 
policies can be compared and more general conclusions can 
be drawn. 
3. Close the session.
INSTRUCTION FOR PARTICIPANTS
1. Each member of the group picks one certainty and one
    uncertainty card at random.
2. Discuss whether the policy developed takes account of the
    certainties and uncertainties that have been picked.
3. Discuss whether the policy will need to be adapted in order
    for it to be viable in the long-term.
GOAL
Share and capture policy implications emerging from  
the parallel discussion.
INSTRUCTION FOR PARTICIPANTS
1. Select a rapporteur in your group and provide a 3-minute
pitch of the lessons learned from the exercise and the policy 
implications that can be derived from these lessons.
STEP 4.1
LONG TERM VIABILITY
STEP 5
POLICY IMPLICATIONS
15
minutes
minutes
?
GOAL
Test the long-term viability of the policies developed in   
STEP 4 using the certainty and uncertainty cards.
ALTERNATIVE
Cards can be prepared beforehand if you wish to test some
particular elements, or if you want to focus on a particular 
theme i.e. social, technological, environmental, economic,
or political .
POSSIBLE DISCUSSION QUESTION
Can you think of an example of how you could apply what 
you have learned today in your ﬁeld of work?  
26
The Scenario Exploration System (SES) is a board 
game that was developed by the European  
Commission's Joint Research Centre (JRC), EU 
Policy Lab, to facilitate the practical use of 
scenarios from foresight studies.* The original 
motivation behind this development was to create 
a platform on which EU policymakers and other 
stakeholders could explore and engage with 
foresight scenarios in a quick and interactive 
process that should make it easier to apply 
foresight to policymaking. The game enables 
participants to develop a long-term perspective 
and consider visions and strategies of different 
stakeholders that include policymakers at different 
governance levels, business and civil society 
representatives and the general public.
The usual format of the game that explores two 
opposing alternative futures takes about 3 hours. 
Over the past years, the tool has proved to have a 
broad range of applications that appealed to diverse 
audiences ranging from EU policymakers, member 
states, civil society and business representatives, 
academics and university students. It was played in 
different institutional settings with participants 
from all around the world.
The migration edition of the SES emerged from the 
Future of Migration in the EU project** and is based 
on migration 2030 scenarios. Its objective is to   
stimulate non-divisive and future-oriented debates 
on this highly politicised issue and to help partici- 
pants dealing with migration to appreciate positions 
of different stakeholders and to align their 
potential actions with relative certainties and 
uncertainties that are likely to affect future 
migration flows and processes. The migration 
edition has been played with diverse audiences 
ranging from migration officials from countries in 
Africa, Latin America and Asia, with European 
Commission officials, with various EU Member 
State representatives, civil society, students and 
academics.
TOOL 5. SCENARIO EXPLORATION SYSTEM
The future of migration in the EU and beyond
A range of issues have been explored through the 
SES such as the future of international protection  
and the role for the European Asylum Support 
Office, strategies for satisfying labour-market 
needs in the EU through international migration or 
fostering diaspora engagement in Europe and the 
European neighbourhood to name just a few.
All the elements that are needed to use the 
migration edition of the SES (board, cards, record 
sheets) are available upon request. Please 
contact alice.szczepanikova@ec.europa.eu for 
more information.
The SES is available to any interested party under 
a Creative Commons licence (CC-BY-SA) that lets 
users use it and transform it according to their 
own needs.
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**This project was run by Alice Szczepanikova and Tine Van Criekinge in 2017. Anna Hakami helped with ﬁnalising the SES Elements. 
*Bontoux et al. 2016. "The JRC Scenario Exploration System - From Study to Serious Game." Journal of Futures Studies 20(3): 93–108
A number of thematic adaptations have been 
developed inside the JRC as well as by independent 
third parties.
Tool 5. Scenario exploration system
MIGRATION DISCUSSION TOOLKIT
28
TOOL 5. SCENARIO 
EXPLORATION SYSTEM 3hours5-13participants 1facilitator
The Scenario Exploration System (SES) is a tool to enable
participants to stimulate their possible paths towards the
future in relation to an issue of their choice around an
exploration board. It operates as a board game. 
The purpose of the Scenario Exploration System is to have 
participants experience and act through plausible alternative 
futures, by thinking and conversing outside of their usual frame 
of reference. The aim is not to play a game and win, but rather 
to promote a constructive conversation amongst key actors, 
and to promote integrated long-term thinking in a spirit of 
collaboration.
Four characters (two Policymakers, a Business and a Civil 
Society Organization) develop and take up roles to chart their 
own courses towards their long-term objectives. They take 
actions to reach these objectives over three rounds towards 
a certain time horizon (usually ca 12-20 years from the 
present day). A ﬁﬅh participant, the Public Voice, analyses 
the actions taken at every round and gives feedback and 
value to the actions taken by the characters. 
Success takes several forms: the character wielding the 
most influence by collecting highest number of points 
throughout the three rounds; the character who has 
reached his/her own long-term objective; or collectively 
by how close the players' actions have brought them to 
a sustainable future.
In the course of a 3-hour session, participants experience 
this time journey twice, holding the same roles under 
contrasting scenarios and pursuing the same long-term 
visions. The Scenario Exploration System can be applied to 
various scenarios and used to discuss a range of issues. 
Roles are flexible. The standard version described here uses 
two policymakers, one civil society representative and one 
business representative.  
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SCENARIO
EXPLORATION 
SYSTEM
Roles
The Public Voice
The Public Voice represents a substantial group of citizens and 
voters. They can choose to support or to rebel against the other 
Scenario Explorers. As the Public Voice is an observer, its 
inﬂuence will not be expressed through actions but through its 
analysis of the situation and the assessment he/she will write 
and share with everyone at the end of each round.
The Scenario Explorers
Policymaker I:
 
This can be either an EU policymaker or a policy- 
maker at the supranational level. This player should represent a 
key actor in a public or political administration responsible for 
decision-making and implementation in the topic being explored. 
Policymaker II: This can be either another EU policymaker, 
national policymaker, or a local authority. This character usually 
has a role to play in setting or implementing national or local 
decisions and has an impact on planning and agenda-setting. 
Business:  This should be a business that has a meaningful 
involvement and/or stake in the topic under discussion. It can be 
a large or multinational company that has an inﬂuential role 
or a small- to medium-sized business that wields some local 
inﬂuence. 
Civil society organisation:  This should be a civil 
society organisation that undertake activities that can 
inﬂuence decision making and/or inﬂuence public opinion. 
Green
Purple
Blue
Yellow
Tool 5. Scenario exploration system
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Elements needed to use the SES: 
1 dice
1 game board (to be printed in A0)
5 Megatrend cards
Megatrend cards present strong driving forces that 
aﬀect all scenarios and must be taken into account 
as far as realistically possible. The Megatrends cards
should be placed on the designated spots on the board.
4 Scenario discs
The Scenario discs give an overview of the social and 
economic conditions created by the scenarios, and specify 
how many resource tokens should be distributed to each 
participant. The Scenario disc being used is placed at the 
centre of the game board. 
SCENARIO
EXPLORATION 
SYSTEM
Requirements &
Elements*
3 SES Scenario detail cards per scenario: 
Scenario details cards provide a sequence of events at 
5-year, 10-year, and 20-year horizons leading to each
scenario. The cards can be placed at the designated
spot on the game board.
Set of “What if” cards
These are variable drivers that have been identiﬁed as 
potentially relevant but with a high level of uncertainty (in 
terms of the direction they will take). They inﬂuence gameplay 
in a random fashion, by becoming concerns of varying 
importance for the participants and the Public Voice. A diﬀerent 
“What if” card will aﬀect each corresponding round as far as is 
realistic. The cards should be placed on the designated spot on 
the board. 
* A separate file with the instructions and all the game elements including the board, the cards and record sheets is accessible here:
http://publications.jrc.ec.europa.eu/repository/bitstream/JRC111539/jrc111539_kjnc29060enn.pdf
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Real life cards
They describe real life events that can be used by the 
Scenario Explorers. Scenario Explorers (not the Public 
Voice) pick 2 Real Life cards. They can play a 
maximum of one Real Life card per round. Each card 
contains the instructions on how to use it. Aﬅer 
having used a card, they pick a new one from the pile 
so as to have the choice between two cards for the 
next round.
1 Public Voice record sheet
To allow recording of its tokens allocation and headlines.
4 Scenario Explorer record sheets
To help the explorers deﬁne their roles and  an account 
of their actions.
1 Scoring record sheet for the Scenario Exploration Master 
To allow recording of the resource token allocations by the 
Scenario Explorers, the Public Voice's red tokens, and to calculate 
the score.
1 set of Action cards per Scenario Explorer 
Each Scenario Explorer (not the Public Voice) receives 
a set of action cards adapted, and colour-coded, to 
their role. Participants can invent new actions if 
 necessary using generic Action cards.  
60 red tokens for the public voice
The Public Voice receives 10 red tokens for each 
round and is free to 
proposed actions as it pleases. 
25 resource tokens (colour-coded to match each 
role) for each of the Scenario Explorers 
Scenario Explorers receive resource tokens to give 
strength to their actions. The number of 
per role for all three rounds of the scenario is stated 
on the Scenario disc. Explorers use resource tokens as 
they please but should distribute them wisely to last 
all three rounds of one scenario exploration.
Tool 5. Scenario exploration system
MIGRATION DISCUSSION TOOLKIT
1. ENSURING THE OVERALL QUALITY OF THE
EXPERIENCE
To be a pleasant, stimulating host.
To explain the rules.
To guide the participants, help create ownership. 
To be familiar with the scenarios. 
2. PRESENTING THE ELEMENTS
Use Megatrends cards to stimulate future 
thinking. Present them in connection to 
current events. 
Explain the use of the “What if” cards. 
Explain the use of Action cards.
Explain the use of Real-life cards.
Explain how scores are calculated.  
3. CREATING THE STORIES
Based on the SES Scenario detail cards.
Start from today and connect to current events. 
State date/year at each round.
Build on outcome of each round.
Improvise to make events more realistic.
4. MANAGING EXPLORATION DYNAMICS
Stimulate the conversation.
Ensure smooth transitions between participants. 
Ask clariﬁcation questions if needed. 
Volunteer suggestions if someone lacks ideas. 
Help participants to take the story seriously.
5. MANAGING TIME
Important for session dynamics.
Session starting time impacts dynamics. If 
possible, opt for morning rather than afternoon 
when participants tend to be more tired. 
Participants must be on time.
Taking a 10 min. refreshment break aﬅer 
exploring the ﬁrst scenario is recommended. 
THE ROLE OF
THE SCENARIO
EXPLORATION
MASTER
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GOAL
1. WELCOME
Welcome participants.
Tour de table, make people feel at ease.
Ask participants for a theme of interest (if not decided 
previously). Select two contrasting scenarios (if not 
decided previously). Note that scenario 1 and 3, and 
scenario 2 and 4 are most contrasting. 
2. DEFINING THE ROLES
Ask participants to develop their role and deﬁne their long-
term objectives in detail (e.g. what does your organisation 
want to achieve in the next 12-15 years?").
For example, the business actor should have a clear business 
plan, deﬁne its location, size, market, suppliers, etc. The civil 
society organisation should deﬁne its scope, objective,  
membership, etc. Policymakers should describe how they 
hope their policy area will develop in the next 12-15 years.
Explain the various roles available.
Make participants choose their role.
Distribute the Explorer record sheets and the Public Voice 
record sheet.
Give participants time to define their roles.
STEP 1 
PREPARING THE 
EXPLORATION 50minutes
.
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3. DISTRIBUTING THE ELEMENTS
Put the selected Scenario disc in the middle 
of the board. Distribute the tokens:
- 30 red tokens to the public voice.
Red tokens are used by the public voice to express its 
opinion. The public voice can spend up to 10 tokens per 
round. It is free to allocate the tokens as it wishes with a 
minimum of one token per action for each Scenario 
Explorer.
- resource tokens to each Scenario Explorer according to 
the distribution indicated on the Scenario disc.
Resource tokens give strength to the actions taken by the 
Scenario Explorers. Scenario Explorers receive one set of 
tokens corresponding to the scenario being explored.  These 
are all the resources that the Scenario Explorer will have 
until the end of this exploration. The Scenario Explorer is 
free to decide how to use his/her resources to support his/
her actions.
Distribute the Action cards to each Scenario Explorer 
Put the Real-life cards on the board.   
Give 2 Real-li fe cards to each Scenario Explorer.
4. CREATING THE EXPLORATION COMMUNITY
Let each participant explain his/her role to all.
Make sure this is detailed enough. It should take 1-2 
minutes to explain.
Explain the use of resources to the Scenario Explorers and 
the red tokens to the Public Voice.
Explain how scores are calculated (see scoring sheet).* 
Distribute 2 Real-life cards to each Scenario Explorer and.
explain their use.
*Each action gets a score by multiplying the number of resource tokens used by a Scenario Explorer to support his/her action by the
number of red tokens attributed to the action by the Public Voice.
Before starting the game, the participants are made aware 
of ﬁve megatrends that will aﬀect all the scenarios in  
the future. The Megatrends cards are initially placed 
face down on the board. The Scenario Exploration Master 
turns the Megatrend cards one by one face up and 
explains how each megatrend is likely to affect the 
scenario exploration over the selected time horizon.
5. CREATING THE CONTEXT FOR THE SCENARIO
EXPLORATION
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GOAL
To explore the ﬁrst scenario and become familiar with the 
rules of the game (the exploration of the second scenario 
takes less time).
1. FIRST ROUND
We are now in the ﬁrst time horizon (in the zone closest to
The Scenario Exploration Master then lays down the pile of 
the Scenario disc).
The Scenario Exploration Master tells a story based on the 
the ﬁrst Scenario detail card. 
“What if” cards face down and reveals the ﬁrst one. 
This ﬁrst “What if” card will inﬂuence the ﬁrst round of the 
scenario exploration as the Scenario Explorers should take 
this factor into account while planning their actions.
  
 
 They put one Action card on the board in the zone 
corresponding to the time horizon.
They support their action with own resources of their choice 
by putting resource tokens on the action card.
Once all four Scenario Explorers have taken action, the 
Public Voice reacts by attributing red tokens. The Public 
Voice can spend up to 10 tokens per round. It is free to 
allocate the tokens as it wishes with a  minimum of one 
token per action. 
During the round, each Scenario Explorer can use one Real- 
life card according to the instructions that each carries. The 
explorers that have used a Real-life card pick a new one 
from the pile. 
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At the end of the round the Scenario Exploration Master 
creates a wrap up story of the round and collects the 
scores.*
*SCORES:
The scores are calculated by the Scenario Exploration
Master aﬅer all Real-life cards have been used. They
result from the multiplication of the resources allocated to
each action by the number of red tokens attributed to the
corresponding actions by the Public Voice.
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Then Scenario Explorers roll the dice:
- the Scenario Explorer who gets the highest score starts.
- the other Scenario Explorers then take action clockwise. 
- Scenario Explorers are asked to consider more particularly
the elements of the Scenario detail cards corresponding to 
the number they rolled on the dice (optional). 
Tool 5. Scenario exploration system
MIGRATION DISCUSSION TOOLKIT
EXPLORER RECORD SHEET
2. SECOND ROUND
The Scenario Exploration Master continues the story based 
on the next Scenario detail card (next time horizon) and 
reveals the next “What if” card.
Scenario Explorers roll the dice and the one who gets the 
highest score starts. The other Scenario Explorers take 
one action in turn clockwise.
They put one Action card on the board
They support their action with own resources of their choice 
by putting resource tokens on the Action card.
The Public Voice reacts by attributing red tokens. The public 
voice can spend up to 10 tokens per round. It is free to 
allocate the tokens as it wishes with a  minimum of one 
token per action. 
During the round, each cenario xplorer can use one Real- 
life card according to the instructions that each carries. 
The explorers that have used a Real-life card pick a 
new one from the pile.
At the end of the round the Scenario Exploration Master 
creates a wrap up story of the round and collects the 
scores.***
3. THIRD ROUND
The third round is identical to the second round.
4. CONCLUSION
At the end, the Scenario Exploration Master summarises the 
scenario exploration, calculates the overall final scores on 
the scoring sheet and asks the Scenario Explorers to assess 
how well they have managed to reach their long-term 
objectives. This self-assesment is expressed on a scale of 1 
- 10 with 10 meaning fully achieving the objective and 1 
meaning not achieving it at all. Aﬅer the Public Voice agrees 
with or modiﬁes this self-assesment, these additional points 
can be added to the ﬁnal score of each Scenario Explorer.   
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Scenario Explorers are asked to consider more particularly the elements of the Scenario detail cards corresponding to the number 
they rolled on the dice (optional).
** For examples of score calculations see page 38.
***Depending on the scenarios and the objectives of the session, the minimum cost for collaboration can be made to vary between the 
two scenarios being explored (optional). 
In the 1st round, the explorers act individually. In the 2nd and
   3rd rounds they can, in addition to acting individually, also 
   collaborate upon request with one, two, or three other 
   explorers. 
In that case, each contributes as many resource tokens as    
desired. The Explorers can solicit collaboration from other players 
when they are explaining their individual actions. Other players 
can reﬂect on this and decide to collaborate only aﬅer all players 
have ﬁnished putting down their actions. If a collaboration is 
agreed, the Scenario Explorer who wants to engage in a 
collaboration puts some of his/her own resource tokens on the 
action(s) he/she wants to collaborate with.**
The collaborations must be completed before the Public Voice
   judges the actions. 
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In the case of collaborations, the owner of the action receives 
the score for the sum of his/her resource tokens plus those of 
the collaborating partner multiplied by the red tokens allocated 
by the Public Voice. The collaborating partner also receives 
some points from that action: but only the points that equal 
the resource tokens that he/she invested in the collaboration 
multiplied by the red tokens attributed by the Public Voice.**  
EXPLORER RECORD SHEET
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on the next Scenario detail card (next time horizon) and 
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Scenario Explorers are asked to consider more particularly the elements of the Scenario detail cards corresponding to the number 
they rolled on the dice (optional).
** For examples of score calculations see page 38.
***Depending on the scenarios and the objectives of the session, the minimum cost for collaboration can be made to vary between the 
two scenarios being explored (optional). 
In the 1st round, the explorers act individually. In the 2nd and
   3rd rounds they can, in addition to acting individually, also 
   collaborate upon request with one, two, or three other 
   explorers. 
In that case, each contributes as many resource tokens as    
desired. The Explorers can solicit collaboration from other players 
when they are explaining their individual actions. Other players 
can reﬂect on this and decide to collaborate only aﬅer all players 
have ﬁnished putting down their actions. If a collaboration is 
agreed, the Scenario Explorer who wants to engage in a 
collaboration puts some of his/her own resource tokens on the 
action(s) he/she wants to collaborate with.**
The collaborations must be completed before the Public Voice
   judges the actions. 
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In the case of collaborations, the owner of the action receives 
the score for the sum of his/her resource tokens plus those of 
the collaborating partner multiplied by the red tokens allocated 
by the Public Voice. The collaborating partner also receives 
some points from that action: but only the points that equal 
the resource tokens that he/she invested in the collaboration 
multiplied by the red tokens attributed by the Public Voice.**  
GOAL
To explore the second scenario.
The exploration of the second scenario takes place on the 
other half of the board.  
It is carried out in an identical fashion as the exploration 
of the ﬁrst scenario (Step 2).
All the participants keep the same roles and long-term 
objectives. However, resource distribution changes 
according to the characteristics of the new scenario as 
indicated on the Scenario disc.
GOAL
To reﬂect on the contrasting explorations.
In this phase, participants look at both sides of the board 
and reﬂect on the similarities and diﬀerences between the 
two scenario explorations,  their success in achieving their 
long-term objectives and overall, the kind of future they 
created with their actions in each of the two scenarios.  
This phase can be structured and extended according to the 
needs of the organiser. 
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Tool 5. Scenario exploration system
MIGRATION DISCUSSION TOOLKIT
ROUND 1
EXAMPLE OF SCORE CALCULATIONS
- A Scenario Explorer invests 3 resource tokens in his/her
action.
- The Public Voice attributes 3 red tokens to this action.
- Result: Unless a Real-life card is used to inﬂuence the
score, the Scenario Explorer scores 9 points in round 1.
3 x 3 = 9
HOW TO CALCULATE THE SCORE
The scores are calculated by the Scenario Exploration 
Master aﬅer all Real-life cards have been used. They result 
from the multiplication of the resources allocated to each 
action by the number of red tokens attributed to the 
corresponding actions by the Public Voice.
ROUND 2 & 3 IN CASE OF COLLABORATIONS
HOW TO CALCULATE THE SCORE
In the case of collaborations, the owner of the action 
receives the score for the sum of his/her resource tokens 
plus those of the collaborating partner multiplied by the 
red tokens allocated by the Public Voice. The collaborating 
partner also receives some points from that action: but 
only the sum of the resource tokens that he/she invested 
in the collaboration multiplied by the red tokens attributed 
by the Public Voice.  
EXAMPLES OF SCORE CALCULATIONS*
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*A Scoring record sheet that will help you with score calculations is included among the SES elements to be found here:
http://publications.jrc.ec.europa.eu/repository/bitstream/JRC111539/jrc111539_kjnc29060enn.pdf 
EXAMPLE OF SCORE CALCULATIONS
- The ﬁrst Scenario Explorer invests 2 resource tokens in his/
her action.
- The second Scenario Explorer wants to collaborate and
adds 3 resource tokens to the action of the ﬁrst Scenario
Explorer.
- Public Voice in the end attributes 2 red tokens to this
action.
- The ﬁrst Scenario Explorer also wants to collaborate with
the third Scenario Explorer and therefore adds 1 resource
token to the action of that Explorer.
- Public Voice in the end attributes 3 red tokens to this
action.
- Result: Unless a Real-life card is used to inﬂuence the
scores, the ﬁrst Scenario Explorer gains 13 points: 10
points from his/her own action (which was supported by the
second Scenario Explorer) plus 3 points from collaboration
with the third Scenario Explorer.
((2+3) x 2) + (1 x 3) = 13
- Result: The second Scenario Explorer gains 6 points from
collaboration with the ﬁrst Scenario Explorer plus the points
gained by his/her own action (Y).
(3 x 2) + Y
FINAL SCORE 
EXAMPLE OF FINAL SCORE CALCULATIONS
- A Scenario Explorer get a score of 6 in the ﬁrst
round.
- The Scenario Explorer get a score of 15 in the
second round.
- The Scenario Explorer get a score of 11 in the
third round.
- The Scenario Explorer gives himself/herself a 7/10
in the self-assessment. That counts as 7 scores.
- Result: The Scenario Explorer gets the ﬁnal score
of 39.
6 + 15 + 11 + 7 = 39
HOW TO CALCULATE THE SCORE
The ﬁnal score of a Scenario Explorer is the sum of 
his/her scores from all 3 rounds of one scenario 
plus the value of the self-assessment done at the 
end of round 3.
ROUND 1
EXAMPLE OF SCORE CALCULATIONS
- A Scenario Explorer invests 3 resource tokens in his/her 
action.
- The Public Voice attributes 3 red tokens to this action.
- Result: Unless a Real-life card is used to inﬂuence the 
score, the Scenario Explorer scores 9 points in round 1.
3 x 3 = 9
HOW TO CALCULATE THE SCORE
The scores are calculated by the Scenario Exploration 
Master aﬅer all Real-life cards have been used. They result 
from the multiplication of the resources allocated to each 
action by the number of red tokens attributed to the 
corresponding actions by the Public Voice.
ROUND 2 & 3 IN CASE OF COLLABORATIONS
HOW TO CALCULATE THE SCORE
In the case of collaborations, the owner of the action 
receives the score for the sum of his/her resource tokens 
plus those of the collaborating partner multiplied by the 
red tokens allocated by the Public Voice. The collaborating 
partner also receives some points from that action: but 
only the sum of the resource tokens that he/she invested 
in the collaboration multiplied by the red tokens attributed 
by the Public Voice.  
EXAMPLES OF SCORE CALCULATIONS*
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*A Scoring record sheet that will help you with score calculations is included among the SES elements to be found here: http://
publications.jrc.ec.europa.eu/repository/bitstream/JRC111539/kjnc29060enn.pdf 
EXAMPLE OF SCORE CALCULATIONS
- The ﬁrst Scenario Explorer invests 2 resource tokens in his/
her action.
- The second Scenario Explorer wants to collaborate and 
adds 3 resource tokens to the action of the ﬁrst Scenario 
Explorer.
- Public Voice in the end attributes 2 red tokens to this 
action.
- The ﬁrst Scenario Explorer also wants to collaborate with 
the third Scenario Explorer and therefore adds 1 resource 
token to the action of that Explorer.
- Public Voice in the end attributes 3 red tokens to this 
action. 
- Result: Unless a Real-life card is used to inﬂuence the 
scores, the ﬁrst Scenario Explorer gains 13 points: 10 
points from his/her own action (which was supported by the 
second Scenario Explorer) plus 3 points from collaboration 
with the third Scenario Explorer.
((2+3) x 2) + (1 x 3) = 13
- Result: The second Scenario Explorer gains 6 points from 
collaboration with the ﬁrst Scenario Explorer plus the points 
gained by his/her own action (Y).
(3 x 2) + Y
FINAL SCORE 
EXAMPLE OF FINAL SCORE CALCULATIONS
- A Scenario Explorer get a score of 6 in the ﬁrst 
round.
- The Scenario Explorer get a score of 15 in the 
second round.
- The Scenario Explorer get a score of 11 in the 
third round.
- The Scenario Explorer gives himself/herself a 7/10 
in the self-assessment. That counts as 7 scores.
- Result: The Scenario Explorer gets the ﬁnal score 
of 39. 
6 + 15 + 11 + 7 = 39
HOW TO CALCULATE THE SCORE
The ﬁnal score of a Scenario Explorer is the sum of 
his/her scores from all 3 rounds of one scenario 
plus the value of the self-assessment done at the 
end of round 3.
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DESCRIPTION
Over the past years, the Scenario Exploration System (SES) and 
the serious gaming approach to policy innovation more generally. 
have gained popularity and the EU Policy Lab has been repeatedly 
approached with the request to assist in applying the SES in 
diﬀerent institutional settings and to audiences of diﬀerent sizes. 
In its original application, the SES requires a trained game-master 
who leads the process and a single game session of three hours 
can accommodate up to ten participants. Although the game-
master training can be delivered in a few hours, the time and 
human resources investment can become too high if the SES is to 
be applied to larger audiences. Therefore, this tool was developed 
in order to serve bigger groups in processes that do not allow for 
prior training of game-masters and preparation of game material 
(i.e. boards, cards, tokens etc.). The broad logic of the game is till 
applied. 
REQUIREMENTS
Facilitation
1-5 facilitators 
Duration
1.5 - 3.5 hours
- Scenario detail cards for one sceanario or two opposing scenarios  
- Scenario poster
CENARIO 
EXPLORATION SUITABLE 
FOR LARGER AUDIENCES
1.5-3.5
 hours
5-50
participants
1-5
facilitators
Conﬁguration
Groups of 5-10 persons each + at least one facilitator
A3
Toolkit elements and materials
Tool 6. Scenario exploration suitable for larger audiences
MIGRATION DISCUSSION TOOLKIT
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Introduce yourself and brieﬂy describe the tool and the 
process.
Brieﬂy introduce yourselves and explain your motivation for 
taking part in this exercise.
Prepare the speciﬁc scenario exploration session.
Open the session:
1. Ask participants for a theme of interest (if needed)
2. Select one scenario (or two contrasting scenarios, if time
allows for it).
 
PREPARING THE EXPLORATION  
10
minutes
 5
minutes
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Introduce yourself and brieﬂy describe the tool and the 
process.
Brieﬂy introduce yourselves and explain your motivation for 
taking part in this exercise.
Prepare the speciﬁc scenario exploration session.
Open the session:
1. Ask participants for a theme of interest (if needed)
2. Select one scenario (or two contrasting scenarios, if time
allows for it).
 
PREPARING THE EXPLORATION  
10
minutes
 5
minutes
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INSTRUCTION FOR FACILITATOR(S)
1.
2. Make participants choose their role (roles can be repeated).
3. Explain that they should develop their role and deﬁne their
long-term objectives.
4. Explain the speciﬁcities of the Public Voice (i.e. to evaluate
actions by the other participants based on a predeﬁned
position of public opinion. This opinion should represent
a substantial part of the population.
5. Give participants time to build their roles.
Explain the 5 available roles (i.e. policymaker I, 
policymaker II, civil society, private sector and Public Voice. 
NB – roles can be adapted as required) 
 
INSTRUCTION FOR PARTICIPANTS
1. Choose a role.
2. Deﬁne who you are, what your position is, and what your
long term objectives are in relation to the chosen theme.
3. Explain your role to the other participants and what your
long-term objectives are.
INSTRUCTION FOR FACILITATOR(S)
1.  Lay down the Megatrend cards one by one face up,
    explaining how each megatrend is likely to aﬀect the
scenario exploration over the selected time horizon.
2. Then lay down the pile of "What if" cards face down
and reveal one, this ﬁrst card will inﬂuence the ﬁrst
round of the scenario exploration.
 
 
STEP 2.1 
DEFINING THE ROLES 
STEP 2.2
CREATING THE CONTEXT FOR THE 
SCENARIO EXPLORATION 
20
minutes
10
minutes
Tool 6. Scenario exploration suitable for larger audiences
MIGRATION DISCUSSION TOOLKIT
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GOAL
To explore and discuss future migration scenarios.  
INSTRUCTION FOR FACILITATOR(S)
1. Take the Scenario detail card for the scenario that has
    been selected.
2. Tell a story based on the selected "What if" card and the ﬁrst
 timeframe of the Scenario detail cards (i.e. 2020).
 
    INSTRUCTION FOR PARTICIPANTS
1.
card, and the story told by the facilitator, discuss what 
actions you would take in order to reach your objectives.
2. Discuss the importance of this action and its relevance for
    reaching your objectives.
3. Identify whether you will need to collaborate with another
    person in order to better reach your objectives.
4. Approach other participants with proposals to collaborate
    and negotiate a possible collaboration.
5. Once all four participants have done the above, the Public
Voice reacts by providing comments on each person's 
actions and possible collaborations. 
Taking into consideration the Megatrends cards, the "What if" 
INSTRUCTION FOR PARTICIPANTS
Repeat the process as in the ﬁrst round, ensuring that each 
action builds upon the previous, takes account of the 
Megatrends and "What if" cards, and brings you closer to 
your desired objective.
STEP 3.0 
EXPLORING THE SCENARIO(S)
FIRST ROUND 
STEP 3.1
SECOND AND THIRD ROUND 
30
minutes
40
minutes
INSTRUCTION FOR FACILITATOR(S)
Repeat the above, by turning over a new "What if" card at 
the start of each round, and telling the story of the 
consecutive timeframe (i.e. 2025 in the second round, and 
2030 in the third round).
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GOAL
To explore and discuss future migration scenarios.  
INSTRUCTION FOR FACILITATOR(S)
1. Take the Scenario detail card for the scenario that has
    been selected.
2. Tell a story based on the selected "What if" card and the ﬁrst
 timeframe of the Scenario detail cards (i.e. 2020).
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card, and the story told by the facilitator, discuss what 
actions you would take in order to reach your objectives.
2. Discuss the importance of this action and its relevance for
    reaching your objectives.
3. Identify whether you will need to collaborate with another
    person in order to better reach your objectives.
4. Approach other participants with proposals to collaborate
    and negotiate a possible collaboration.
5. Once all four participants have done the above, the Public
Voice reacts by providing comments on each person's 
actions and possible collaborations. 
Taking into consideration the Megatrends cards, the "What if" 
INSTRUCTION FOR PARTICIPANTS
Repeat the process as in the ﬁrst round, ensuring that each 
action builds upon the previous, takes account of the 
Megatrends and "What if" cards, and brings you closer to 
your desired objective.
STEP 3.0 
EXPLORING THE SCENARIO(S)
FIRST ROUND 
STEP 3.1
SECOND AND THIRD ROUND 
30
minutes
40
minutes
INSTRUCTION FOR FACILITATOR(S)
Repeat the above, by turning over a new "What if" card at 
the start of each round, and telling the story of the 
consecutive timeframe (i.e. 2025 in the second round, and 
2030 in the third round).
GOAL
INSTRUCTION FOR FACILITATOR(S) AND PARTICIPANTS
If time allows, an opposing scenario can be explored by
repeating STEP 3.0 - 3.1.   
INSTRUCTION FOR  PARTICIPANTS
1. Reﬂect on the similarities and diﬀerences between the two
    scenario explorations.
2. Reﬂect on the constraints and opportunities you faced in
    the diﬀerent scenarios.
 
STEP 3.2 
EXPLORING AN OPPOSING SCENARIO
STEP 3.1
DISCUSSION 
60
minutes
15 -30
minutes
INSTRUCTION FOR  FACILITATORS
This phase can be structured and extended according to the
needs of the organiser. 
 
POSSIBLE DISCUSSION QUESTION
Can you think of an example of how you could apply what 
you have learned today in your ﬁeld of work?  
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DESCRIPTION
 While scenario building is normally a lengthy process involving 
several iterations and the participation of a variety of 
stakeholders and experts,* the following tool provides a more 
expedient way of developing scenarios when faced with time 
constraints. In using this tool, the four migration scenarios that 
are used in this toolkit can be easily adapted to better ﬁt the 
theme and topics that users would like to explore further. In 
addition, users can also create entirely new scenarios based on  
diﬀerent axes, narratives and time frames. The outcome of this 
exercise can be used in the Scenario Exploration System. 
Furthermore, Step 7 of this tool demonstrates how users can 
adapt existing scenarios for use with the Scenario Exploration 
System. This tool allows users to quickly create and adapt 
scenarios and the accompanying serious game to their own 
needs, topics and themes. 
REQUIREMENTS
Facilitation
1 facilitator
Duration
5 hours
aterial
BUILDING NEW 
SCENARIOS OR ADAPTING 
EXISTING ONES TO BE USED WITH THE 
SCENARIO EXPLORATION SYSTEM 
 5 
hours
8-16
participants
 1
 facilitator
- Post-its
 - Certainty and uncertainty cards (optional) (available for EU and non-EU)
- Pens and markers
- Flip chart, white board, or poster paper 
 - Dot stickers (optional)
- Templates for scenario axes and for STEEP categories (optional)
* For an in-depth introduction into scenario planning, see for example Schwartz, Peter, The Art of the Long View: Planning for the Future in an
Uncertain World, New York: Currency Doubleday, 1996.
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Introduce yourself and brieﬂy describe the tool and the 
process.
Brieﬂy introduce yourselves and explain your motivation for 
taking part in this exercise.
To agree on what scenarios will apply to the chosen theme 
and to deﬁne the time horizon. 
SCOPING AND SYSTEM DEFINITION 
10
minutes
30
minutes
2. Choose the time horizon towards which the scenarios will
be built.
  
1. Decide on a common theme or topic on which scenarios
will be built.
    PARTICIPANTS 
Tool 7. Building new scenarios or adapting existing ones to be used with the scenario exploration system
MIGRATION DISCUSSION TOOLKIT
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GOAL
To identify all elements of change relevant to the future of
the chosen topic.
INSTRUCTION FOR FACILITATOR
1. Explain the concept of drivers of change to the participants
    (i.e. agents that will drive the future change in a given theme
    or topic, starting from today's state-of-play).
2. Explain that drivers of change should be found in each STEEP
    category (Social, Technological, Economic, Environmental, 
    Political).
3. Use the Certainty and Uncertainty cards as samples of
    drivers of change.
4. Once participants start to identify the drivers, collect post-its
    and arrange according to category.
5. Ensure coherence and possible reformulation if necessary.
INSTRUCTION FOR PARTICIPANTS
1. Brainstorm on what drivers may impact on your chosen topic
    and explain why.
2. On post-its, identify a maximum number of drivers of change
    in each of the STEEP categories.
3. Split into groups to facilitate the work.
4. Collect all the drivers and put these on walls or spread across
a table or large poster paper according to category.
STEP 3 
DRIVERS OF CHANGE
80
minutes
?
ALTERNATIVE
Rather than brainstorming on drivers of change from scratch, 
use the stack of Certainty and Uncertainty cards (organised 
according to STEEP categories)* to kick start the conversation 
or as the set of drivers of change.
** The cards are available here: http://publications.jrc.ec.europa.eu/repository/bitstream/JRC111538/kjnb29060enn.pdf
46
GOAL
To identify all elements of change relevant to the future of
the chosen topic.
INSTRUCTION FOR FACILITATOR
1. Explain the concept of drivers of change to the participants
    (i.e. agents that will drive the future change in a given theme
    or topic, starting from today's state-of-play).
2. Explain that drivers of change should be found in each STEEP
    category (Social, Technological, Economic, Environmental, 
    Political).
3. Use the Certainty and Uncertainty cards as samples of
    drivers of change.
4. Once participants start to identify the drivers, collect post-its
    and arrange according to category.
5. Ensure coherence and possible reformulation if necessary.
INSTRUCTION FOR PARTICIPANTS
1. Brainstorm on what drivers may impact on your chosen topic
    and explain why.
2. On post-its, identify a maximum number of drivers of change
    in each of the STEEP categories.
3. Split into groups to facilitate the work.
4. Collect all the drivers and put these on walls or spread across
a table or large poster paper according to category.
STEP 3 
DRIVERS OF CHANGE
80
minutes
?
ALTERNATIVE
Rather than brainstorming on drivers of change from scratch, 
use the stack of Certainty and Uncertainty cards (organised 
according to STEEP categories)* to kick start the conversation 
or as the set of drivers of change.
** The cards are available here: http://publications.jrc.ec.europa.eu/repository/bitstream/JRC111538/kjnb29060enn.pdf
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GOAL
To identify the scenario logic (the axes).
INSTRUCTION FOR FACILITATOR
1. Explain that participants will vote on the impact and
    uncertainty of the drivers.
2. Explain that impact means the extent to which the driver
    will inﬂuence or create a change.
3. Explain that uncertainty means that it is unclear in what
    direction or what speed the driver will evolve.
4. When voting on impact, select the 10-15 drivers that are
    most voted.
5. When voting on uncertainty, place the 10-15 most voted
    drivers on a graph of impact versus uncertainty.
6. Select the two most voted drivers..
INSTRUCTION FOR PARTICIPANTS
1. Using sticker dots, or a pen, vote on the 5 drivers of change
    you believe will have most impact. 
2. Select the 10-15 most voted drivers of change.
3. Using 4 sticker dots or a pen, and using the 10-15
remaining drivers, vote again on the drivers that you think
are the most uncertain.
4. The most voted drivers are placed on an impact versus
uncertainty graph.
5. The two most impactful and most uncertain drivers of change
are selected as axes upon which to build the scenarios.
For example in the 2030 migration scenarios presented in the 
accompanying report, the two selected axes were the 
direction of governance and economic convergence versus 
divergence among world regions.
STEP 4 
PRIORITISATION AND DEFINING THE AXES
20
minutes
ATTENTION
Uncertainty does not indicate that the change will or will not 
happen but rather impacts the direction and speed of 
change.
Tool 7. Building new scenarios or adapting existing ones to be used with the scenario exploration system
MIGRATION DISCUSSION TOOLKIT
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INSTRUCTION FOR PARTICIPANTS
1. For each scenario, write the stories explaining how the
present evolved to bring us to each scenario and split them
in three time steps (i.e. how did we get here?).
2. Each group presents a story and gets comments from all.
INSTRUCTION FOR FACILITATOR
1. On a white board or ﬂip chart, draw the 2 axes, formulating
    4 scenario quadrants.
2. Ask participants to ﬁll each quadrant with key words
    according to the scenario logic.
3. As a second step, split participants into 4 groups, assign
   each group a diﬀerent scenario, and ask them for key words
   and bullet points in each STEEP category for their scenario.
4. Once completed, ask each group to look at the work done by
    the other scenario groups.
5. Ensure consistency and comparability between the scenarios.
 
GOAL
To create a draﬅ of 4 scenario narratives.  
INSTRUCTION FOR FACILITATOR
1. Split the participants into 2 groups.
2. Provide each group with 2 scenarios (one diagonal, i.e.
two contrasting scenarios).
STEP 5
REFLECTION ON THE SCENARIOS
STEP 6
DEVELOPING THE NARRATIVES
60
minutes
60
minutes
GOAL
To deﬁne the core dynamic of each scenario.   
INSTRUCTION FOR PARTICIPANTS
1. Fill each quadrant with key words according to the scenario
   logic.
2. Split-up into groups and choose a scenario to work on.
3. Come up with key words and bullet points in the STEEP
categories for the chosen scenario.
4. Once complete, look at the work done by the other scenario
groups.
5. Fill-in or enhance the other scenarios.
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two contrasting scenarios).
STEP 5
REFLECTION ON THE SCENARIOS
STEP 6
DEVELOPING THE NARRATIVES
60
minutes
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minutes
GOAL
To deﬁne the core dynamic of each scenario.   
INSTRUCTION FOR PARTICIPANTS
1. Fill each quadrant with key words according to the scenario
   logic.
2. Split-up into groups and choose a scenario to work on.
3. Come up with key words and bullet points in the STEEP
categories for the chosen scenario.
4. Once complete, look at the work done by the other scenario
groups.
5. Fill-in or enhance the other scenarios.
INSTRUCTION FOR FACILITATOR
1. Present the participants with a sample of the elements
included in the Scenario Exploration System (notably,
"What if" cards, Action cards, Scenario detail cards,
Scenario discs).
2. Split participants into 2 groups, each with opposing scenarios.
3. Ask participants to adapt the elements according to their 2
scenarios.
 
See Tool 5: SCENARIO EXPLORATION SYSTEM
See Tool 6: SCENARIO EXPLORATION SUITABLE FOR LARGER
AUDIENCES 
STEP 7
ADJUSTING EXISTING SCENARIOS FOR 
THE SCENARIO EXPLORATION SYSTEM 
(Optional)
STEP 8
RUN A SCENARIO EXPLORATION 
SYSTEM SESSION WITH NEW 
SCENARIOS
30
minutes
160
minutes
GOAL
To use the scenario narratives for adaptation to the elements 
needed for the Scenario Exploration System.
INSTRUCTION FOR PARTICIPANTS
1. Develop each scenario story into 6 bullet points per time
(this step will become the text of the Scenario detail cards).
2. Look at the list of drivers, select the drivers voted uncertain
and/or impactful (these will become the "What if" cards).
3. Identify the various roles relevant for role-playing in this
scenario and identify a set of actions for each role (these will
become the Action cards) and the level of inﬂuence for each
role in each scenario (this will become the basis for the
tokens given to each player in each scenario – adapt the
Scenario discs accordingly).
 
If you have already pre-prepared scenarios that you would 
like to use with the Scenario Exploration System, that can be 
done by following the steps outlined below. 
ATTENTION
ATTENTION
The Scenario Exploration System's elements can be 
downloaded as a separate document.* All elements can be 
adapted to ﬁt user requirements or needs.
* http://publications.jrc.ec.europa.eu/repository/bitstream/JRC111539/jrc111539_kjnc29060enn.pdf 
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GETTING IN TOUCH 
If you have questions, please get in touch with us. We 
would also be happy to hear your feedback on the tools 
and learn how you used them in your field of work. 
EU Policy Lab 
JRC-I2@ec.europa.eu
https://blogs.ec.europa.eu/eupolicylab/
The Migration Toolkit is accompanied by a number of 
elements (such as templates and cards) that support 
the use of the tools. In the following pages, you see 
examples of some of these elements. All the Migration 
Discussion Toolkit Elements can be downloaded as 
separate documents.* 
ANNEX: EXAMPLES OF MIGRATION 
TOOLKIT ELEMENTS
*Scenario Exploration System instructions and elements; other Migration Discussion Toolkit elements: 
http://publications.jrc.ec.europa.eu/repository/bitstream/JRC111538/kjnb29060enn.pdf
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Name: Clarita 
Country of origin: Philippines, mid-sized city
Age: 34
Family situation: 2 children (10 & 5 year-old), husband recently  
unemployed, elderly parents, two of her sisters already left 
Philippines to work abroad, one brother stayed
Skills level / education: trained as a nurse in the Philippines, 
works at city hospital
PERSONA 
Situation:
With her husband without a job and elderly parents who need 
expensive healthcare, the family is struggling to get by on Clarita's 
income. She would like to see her children get good education. Her 
sisters seem to be doing well abroad and are sending money home. 
Year Description Year Description
- What options do you consider? Why?
- What are the obstacles to carry out your (migration/non-migration) decision? (e.g. lack of visa or a work permit) 
- What factors are facilitating your (migration/non-migration) decision? (e.g.exchange of information with friends 
already settled abroad, improved security and job prospects)
- Do you migrate? Why or why not?
- If you migrate: When? How? Where to? Who migrates and who stays?
- Are there multiple migrations? If so, explain when, how, why and who for each destination.
- Do migration policies have any effects on your decisions to migrate or not to migrate?
- Do migration policies have any unintended consequences?
- What other factors affect your decisions?
- Do any other policies in your country of origin, transit or destination affect your decisions?
Decision to migrate and the role of policies 
When developing the story, try to cover the following questions:
Scenario:  Scenario: 
Year Description Year Description
Scenario:                                                       Scenario:
MAIN LESSONS LEARNED:
KEY IMPLICATIONS FOR PRESENT AND FUTURE:
Year Description Year Description
Scenario:                                                       Scenario:
MAIN LESSONS LEARNED:
KEY IMPLICATIONS FOR PRESENT AND FUTURE:
INTEGRATION STAKEHOLDER 
Type: Immigrant integration stakeholder 
Level: City-level / regional-level authority
Please briefly specify who you are:
What responsibilities, capacities and available resources do you have to take actions in support 
of immigrant integration?
What are your short-term (1-2 years) and mid-term (2-4 years) priorities with regard to 
immigrant integration?
Year Description Year Description     
Scenario:                                                   Scenario:
Integration-related decisions and actions in response to evolving future scenarios 
When developing the story, make a note of the aspects below and indicate a year in which different actions 
and developments take place: 
1. What room for manoeuvre do you have in the scenario? Why?
2. What policies are you going to develop?
3. With whom will you need to cooperate?
4. What are the major challenges and opportunities you expect to encounter?
5. Do migration policies have any intended or unintended effects on your policies and actions?
6. What other factors are likely to significantly affect your policies and actions?
7. Which other policies are likely to significantly affect your decisions and actions?
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